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Abstract 
This dissertation traces the changing strategies adopted by Irish republicans in competition with 
one another, during the period 1965-72. Two distinct forms of political conflict are identified 
and examined: internal and inter-organisational competition. In each political context, the 
competitive strategies devised and employed were markedly different. Between 1965-9, the 
predominant form of republican competition was intra-organisational in nature. Rival teams 
within the IRA were formed as a result of ideological divergence. In a most strategic fashion, 
these teams adopted a range of manoeuvres aimed at securing the levers of power. This 
dissertation argues, contrary to former historical accounts, that the IRA split of 1969 was 
triggered by a shift in control. One team managed to eventually obtain the means of control so 
as to allow them to determine the direction of that revolutionary vehicle. Consequently, the 
losing faction(s) were forced to adopt a second-rate, schismatic, strategy. Splits are, therefore, 
indicative of centralisation within an organisation and can only be indirectly explained by 
ideological and strategic divisions. The split, in severely fragmenting republican politics, 
qualitatively transformed the competition. Rival IRAs, amid decentralisation in Northern Ireland, 
engaged in a dual contest between themselves and the British state to control events and 
spaces. In this context, violence was frequently adopted as a means of extending and 
maintaining authority. By isolating the strands of republican competition for analysis, it is argued 
that the civil war in Northern Ireland must be re-examined as an entanglement of secondary and 
primary conflicts. Multiple lines of competition overlapped with one another making it difficult 
to determine who were allies and enemies.   
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Introduction 
I 
Republican Car Share 
On the morning of 7 July 1972, in the border region of north-west Derry, MI6 officer Frank Steele 
awaited the arrival of a Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)1 leadership delegation. Talks 
between them and the Northern Ireland Secretary of State, William Whitelaw, had been 
scheduled for later that day. Concerned by their lateness, Steele feared that the talks were off, 
when suddenly ‘up drove a car at a rate of knots, absolutely bulging with IRA.’2 
The historic meeting was reached as a result of a dual bargaining process. Discussions between 
British and republican representatives paralleled internal talks within the PIRA. The PIRA Chief 
of Staff (C/S), Seán MacStíofáin, who headed the delegation that day, had on 27 June visited 
North Belfast to explain policy direction to volunteers in a pub, the Starry Plough.3 A few weeks 
prior to that, MacStíofáin had been set an ultimatum by the Belfast brigade staff regarding the 
release of an important detainee.4 Leading PIRA members also made incompatible judgements 
regarding the political significance of these talks. Some of those in the car that day were 
optimistic, while others were pessimistic. Some interpreted the forthcoming meeting in military 
terms; one of them had even contemplated arriving in paramilitary regalia. While others hoped 
that it would be the start of a dynamic process of political negotiation.5  
The above episode allows us to arrive at a conceptualisation of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
as a revolutionary vehicle. The primary and secondary material available on the IRA is littered 
with metaphoric hints of ‘roads’ and ‘paths’. Dieter Reinisch noted the preponderance of such 
 
1 Also known as the Provisionals and Provos.  
2 Steele recalled these events in a rare interview with journalist Peter Taylor; see Peter Taylor, Provos: 
The IRA and Sinn Fein (London, 1998), 139-140.  
3 The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), War Office (WO) 305/4747/2, 39 Brigade INTSUM, 
5 July 1972. 
4 The specified detainee was Gerry Adams, see Ed Moloney, Voices from the Grave: Two Men’s War in 
Ireland (London, 2010), 96-7.  
5 Dave O’Connell, an Army Council member present that day, took non-violent strategy seriously. See, 
Maria McGuire, To Take Arms: A Year in the Provisional IRA (London, 1973), 73, 125, 132. O’Connell and 
Gerry Adams’s political acumen was recorded by British officials following a preliminary meeting which 
appears to have distorted their view of the PIRA leadership as a whole; TNA, Prime Minister’s Office 
(PREM) 15/1009, Note of a Meeting with Representatives of the Provisional IRA, 21 June 1972. The 
leadership figure who considered wearing military outfit was Ivor Bell, a prominent member of the 
Belfast brigade. He and Belfast Commanding Officer, Seamus Twomey, were noted as being eager to 
return to the war path. MacStíofáin appears to have propitiously believed that the ‘British wanted out’ 
and sought to dictate rather than engage in open-ended dialogue; see Taylor, Provos, 137, 142-4.  
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figurative speech in a recent round of interviews he conducted with female republicans.6 Still 
further, a British intelligence report in mid-1975 stated that volunteers ‘may have been waiting 
for a steer from the Dublin leadership’, and a British observer, in July 1977, recorded a ‘change 
of direction’ following that year’s Bodenstown oration.7 A decade previous, Sean Garland, in his 
1968 Bodenstown oration, stated that the IRA ‘must only be regarded as a weapon or instrument 
by which we can attain the freedom of the Irish people…’.8 Garland did not specify what type of 
‘instrument’ the IRA resembled. This conceptual imprecision, however, can be addressed by 
combining the above source material. References to steering, changes of direction, and the 
mapping of revolutionary routes all suggest that the IRA served a transportive function 
comparable to that of a vehicle. 
Elsewhere revolutionaries have produced similar images. The Guinea-Bissau nationalist, Amilcar 
Cabral, turned his listeners into spectators when he said: ‘A revolution is like a train journey. At 
every stop, some people get on, other people get off.’9 For Cabral, a revolution transformed 
disparate persons into a ‘well defined entirety seeking one path’. This newly  formed unity was 
to be understood in a ‘dynamic sense’, ‘unity… in motion’.10 Cabral’s emphasis upon there being 
‘one path’ was not unique, it pervades revolutionary rhetoric.11 The idea that revolutionary 
vehicles are unidirectional, however, does not correspond with reality. As suggested by the 
opening vignette, the direction taken is disputed internally, and such disputation often leads to 
competition for control of that instrument.  
This conceptualisation is important in understanding Irish republican internal politics for it 
dispels the assumption that organisations, or groups in general, are unitary actors, possessing a 
cohesion comparable to that of an individual agent. In giving an organisation, or group, a mind 
of its own, it deprives its membership of agency, rendering them unable to act and think for 
themselves, and instead portrays them as ‘following a script handed down to them’.12 Once we 
understand organisations to be instruments, whose control and direction are contested from 
 
6 Dieter Reinisch, ‘Women’s Agency and Political Violence: Irish Republican Women and the Formation 
of the Provisional IRA, 1967-70’, Irish Political Studies, 34 (2019), 428.  
7 TNA, WO 305/4646/1, HQ Northern Ireland INTSUM, 20 August 1975; TNA, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) 87/626, Provisional Sinn Fein: Change of Direction, 27 July 1977.  
8 United Irishman, July 1968.  
9 William Finnegan, A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique (London, 1992), 133. 
10 Amilcar Cabral, Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writing, trans. Michael Wolfers (New York, 1979), 
28-9.  
11 For references to ‘the right road’ see Liam McMillen: Separatist, Socialist, Republican ([Official] Sinn 
Fein, 1976), ii; Republican News, May 1971.  
12 Simon Prince and Geoffrey Warner, Belfast and Derry in Revolt: A New History of the Troubles (Dublin, 
2012), 5. For a more detailed discussion see Rogers Brubaker, ‘Ethnicity without Groups’, European 
Journal of Sociology, 43 (2002), 163-89.   
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within, agency is restored to individuals. In the case of Irish republican organisations, we are 
contending with vehicles constructed so as to reach a particular political destination, an all-
Ireland democracy. Revolutionary vehicles were not bounded by train tracks as Cabral sought to 
convey but rather the possibilities of direction were diverse. As Simon Prince and Geoffrey 
Warner, have asserted, ‘The IRA was no more a unitary actor than the civil rights movement 
was’.13 Republicans formulated different visionary road maps and sought to implement them by 
securing the ‘levers of power’; the abstract steering wheel determined direction, while the gears 
adjusted the speed of motion.14 
II 
Political Conflicts in Political Contexts 
This dissertation is concerned with the political conflicts that arose within and between 
republican organisations during the period 1965-72. In taking the organisation as the unit of 
analysis I am building upon a burgeoning literature which seeks to move beyond ethnic 
interpretations of civil conflicts.15 Academics from across the scholarly field, including political 
scientists, sociologists, and historians, have recently questioned the analytical veracity of 
understanding such conflicts in principally ethnic terms. The formerly fashionable atavistic and 
ethnic interpretations argued that affective bonds and/or cultural affinity mobilised people into 
coherent, highly antagonistic, communal blocs. Most modern conflicts were, thus, taken to be 
intercommunal struggles between polarised groups.16 This view, however, was premised upon 
an outdated primordial understanding of how group identity works. The now widely accepted 
constructivist approach stresses that identity is multi-layered and changeable; ‘groupness’ 
hardens and weakens according to the situation.17 Group identity is, thus, a most ‘situational 
construct’ not some transhistorical entity.18 
 
13 Simon Prince and Geoffrey Warner, ‘The IRA and its Rivals: Political Competition and the Turn to 
Violence in the Early Troubles’, Contemporary British History, 27 (2013), 277.   
14 Belfast PIRA operator, Brendan Hughes, referred to obtaining the ‘reins of power’; see Moloney, 
Voices from the Grave, 204.  
15 Stathis Kalyvas, ‘Ethnic Defection in Civil War’, Comparative Political Studies, 41 (2008), 1063.   
16 The foundational work here being Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, 1985). It 
has been challenged by David Laitin and James Fearon who find that ‘weak’ states, not ethnically diverse 
societies, are more prone to civil war. For this see James Fearon and David Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, 
and Civil War’, American Political Review, 97 (2003), 75-90.  
17 For emphasis upon groupness as opposed to groupism, see Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups, 164-8, 
176-9. 
18 For the view that identity is a ‘situational construct’, see Fredrik Barth, ‘Introduction’, in Frederik 
Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Ethnic Difference (Boston, 1969), 
9-38. The specialist work focused on Northern Ireland is as follows: Richard Bourke, ‘Languages of 
Conflict and the Northern Ireland Troubles’, The Journal of Modern History, 83 (2011), 544-78; Simon 
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The argument was, however, always flawed in another important aspect, in that, as Richard 
Bourke has argued, ‘common feeling is not sufficient to unite individual wills into a coherent 
plan of action.’19 This point was reinforced in the opening section of this thesis, republicans came 
together to form an entity, the IRA, out of shared beliefs. In order to escape political alienation, 
they elected a representative leadership, the driver, who possessed the means of control, and 
simultaneously transformed themselves into a functionable instrument, a car, pertaining a 
degree of coordination otherwise impossible. Both the driver and vehicle were mutually 
dependent upon one another.20  
In contrast, ethnicity is incapable of mobilising people into singular, coordinated, units. Kathleen 
Cunningham, Kristin Bakke, and Lee Seymour, have shown that those who share the same 
ethnicity, or some other group identity, such as class, are politically fragmented, leading to the 
proliferation of competing parties and paramilitaries all claiming to represent the same 
‘group’.21 Organisations do not embody ‘groups’ rather they align themselves with certain group 
identities; and for political purposes often go to great lengths to summon and strengthen those 
identities through planned agitation and provocation.22  
Turning specifically to the case of the Northern Ireland Troubles we are confronted with a most 
political conflict, in two different senses of the term ‘political’, one regarding stimuli and the 
other form. The ‘master cleavage’, as enunciated by Bourke, was a contest over the meaning of 
democracy, each party to the conflict, unionist, nationalist, republican, and socialist, legitimated 
their political aspirations in pointing to some majority will. An article in the PIRA’s Belfast paper, 
Republican News, in July 1972, vehemently assured its readers that the British forces and loyalist 
‘thugs’ would be swept away by a ‘people who are the MAJORITY’.23 For republicans, the 
majority was the Irish nationalist people. While unionists contended that, as the majority in 
Northern Ireland, they had the right to rule even at the expense of full citizenship rights to the 
 
Prince, ‘Against Ethnicity: Democracy, Equality, and the Northern Ireland Conflict’, Journal of British 
Studies, 57 (2018), 783-811.  
19 Richard Bourke, Peace in Ireland: The War of Ideas (London, 2012), xiv.  
20 Inspired by Pierre Bourdieu’s assertion that ‘One must always risk political alienation in order to 
escape from political alienation’, see Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, trans. Gino 
Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, 1991), 204.  
21 See, for example, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Kristin M. Bakke and Lee J.M. Seymour, ‘E pluribus 
unum, ex uno plures: Competition, Violence, and Fragmentation in Ethnopolitical Movements’, Journal 
of Peace Research, 53 (2016), 3-18; Kristin M. Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and Lee J.M. 
Seymour, ‘A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars’, Perspectives on 
Politics, 10 (2012),265-83.  
22 The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) engaged in deliberate provocation in a ‘group-making’ project, see 
Brubaker, ‘Ethnicity without Groups’, 171-2.  
23 Republican News, 14 July 1972.  
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minority. In each case the democratic ‘majority’ was taken to be the sovereign ‘people’. The 
majoritarian foundations of each ideology led to the unanswerable question of which majority 
ought to matter. The essence of a democratic state being the right of a community of privilege, 
not some section of it, and a democratic government, established by the will of the majority, 
ruling for the total good, was lost. Instead each party was fuelled by an egalitarian drive to fulfil 
their supposed democratic rights and any opposition was countenanced as a violation of 
normative modern principles.24  
The form that the conflict took by 1970, that being a civil war, was not predetermined. As Bourke 
stated: ‘Ideas on their own did not simply make war- but still, without a clash of ideas there 
would have been no war.’25 In other words, while ideas stimulate political actions, they do not 
determine their nature. The political context sets the limits and possibilities of action. Many are 
inclined to view the Troubles as one ‘long hot summer’.26 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, 
proponents of the ethno-national approach, have even referenced the famous weather analogy 
offered by the seventeenth century political philosopher Thomas Hobbes.27 Violence, according 
to the ethnic interpretative scheme, is a degree of an intractable intercommunal conflict that 
occurs with the rising temperature of tensions.28 Antagonism may be latent for a while, 
restrained by deterrence, but there is every chance the ethnic flame will rekindle. According to 
Frank Wright, peace on an ethnic frontier is merely a cold war.29 Northern Ireland is, thus, taken 
to be an inherently unstable polity that could collapse, just as the weather changes, into a frenzy 
of violence. But this is a misappropriation of Hobbes’s analogy, war is not a most unpredictable 
occurrence rather behaviour in the context of war is. Civilians are left in a state of anxiety as 
human behaviour becomes increasingly unpredictable; war is, thus, not saturated by 
untrammelled rage but fear.30  
War is instead understood in this thesis to be the equalisation of social power. It is a political 
context in which either no authority exists, exposing the equality of humankind, termed 
anarchic, or rival authorities proliferate, known as civil and interstate wars. More specifically, 
 
24 Bourke, War of Ideas, xi-xxiv, 1-20; Bourke, ‘Languages of Conflict’, 549-50, 570-1, 574; Prince, 
‘Against Ethnicity’, 800.  
25 Bourke, War of Ideas, xviii.  
26 Summary and critique offered in Malachi O’Doherty, The Trouble with Guns: Republican Strategy and 
the Provisional IRA (Belfast, 1998), 43, 126-7.  
27 Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland 
(London, 1996), 327.  
28 The argument pervades the literature, see, for example, Gearóid Ó Faoleán, A Broad Church: The 
Provisional IRA in the Republic of Ireland 1969-1980 (Newbridge, 2019), 168.  
29 Tim Wilson, ‘Frank Wright Revisited’, Irish Political Studies, 26 (2011), 280-2.  
30 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, xiii, 8. Also see O’Doherty, Trouble with Guns, 127. 
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civil war is the equalisation of social power between rival authorities within a formerly 
centralised setting. This is in line with the definition given by the political scientist, Stathis 
Kalyvas. Kaylvas defines civil war as follows, ‘armed combat within the boundaries of a 
recognised sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the onset of the 
hostilities.’31 Kalyvas’s classification moves beyond the typically held notion that war can simply 
be reduced to largescale violence; in his words, ‘Civil wars are political contexts where violence 
is used to challenge and to build order’.32 War is not a quantitative degree of violence or conflict, 
it is a qualitatively distinct context in which violence is likely to be used.33 Violence is adopted in 
this context of divided sovereignty as each armed actor seeks to extend its authoritative reach.34 
The relative military power between the armed actors may be symmetrical or asymmetrical, 
leading to conventional or irregular warfare.35 However, even in irregular civil wars, the armed 
guerrillas still manage to exert themselves over local areas through the selective use of violence 
and the creation of alternative administrative structures. Notably then, even when military 
power is unequal, guerrillas manage to find ways to equalise social power. Violence, in this 
context, becomes a function of control, produced in proportion to the level of control held by 
an armed actor in a certain space.36  
This innovative definition of civil war, allied with the outlined revisionist scholarship, allows us 
to re-examine the Troubles through an organisational lens equipped with political tools of 
analysis. Prince has already begun this task of revision by highlighting newly released archival 
material which shows that, in the autumn of 1969, ‘Belfast was breaking up into little republics’, 
as action and defence committees proliferated. Loyalist confrontations that occurred on 10-11 
October 1969, previously interpreted as an emotional outburst from ‘Protestant Belfast’ 
following the publication of the Hunt report on policing in Northern Ireland, are instead shown 
to have been pre-planned and coordinated.37 Prince and Warner’s collaborative work shows that 
by the summer of 1970, republican organisations, the PIRA and their rivals, the Official Irish 
Republican Army (OIRA),38 were dictating the course, and pace, of events in the nationalist areas 
 
31 Stathis N.Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York, 2006), 17. 
32 Stathis N. Kalyvas, ‘Promises and Pitfalls of an Emerging Research Program: The Microdynamics of Civil 
War’, in Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud (eds.), Order, Conflict, and Violence 
(Cambridge, 2008), 406.  
33 Kalyvas, Logic of Violence, 20.  
34 Ibid. 87.  
35 Ibid. 83-85.  
36 Ibid. 87-145, 210- 245. 
37 Prince, ‘Against Ethnicity’, 801-4.  
38 Also known as Officials and Stickies. 
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of Belfast.39 Central authority was receding while rival organisations were, crucially, 
proliferating. The focus can now shift to a specified analysis of these republican organisations 
who were to prove such crucial actors during the civil war in Northern Ireland.  
III 
Irish Republican Internal Conflicts 
The conflicts between Irish republicans can be disaggregated into two forms: internal and inter-
organisational competition. In each political context, the strategies adopted were different, and 
changed overtime. The competitive options available expanded and contracted relative to the 
levels of control held by competitors. The internal competition was stimulated principally by 
divisions over direction which led to the formation of internal teams who competed to obtain 
the means of control at the expense of their rivals. The aim of the internal game was to acquire 
‘seats of authority’ through a range of manoeuvres. The ‘game changer’, in this context, was 
found to be structural changes which sought to create, and tactically fill, new ‘positions of 
influence’.40 This form of competition was mostly peaceful in nature despite high levels of 
frustration and anger being recorded.  
In examining the internal dynamics of the IRA between 1965-9 in this way, a new understanding 
of the 1969 split is reached. Instead of thinking of splits as ‘breaking points’ I argue that they 
must be seen as turning points.41 In the case of the 1960s, one competitive team, labelled as 
Marxist republican, eventually managed to win the internal game by obtaining the ‘levers of 
power’. This allowed them to positively determine the direction taken. The losing faction(s), in 
order to salvage some control, and compete on a new plain, formed a splinter group, the PIRA. 
Splits are, therefore, indicative of centralisation and can only be indirectly explained by 
ideological and strategic divisions.42  
The consequent inter-organisational competition, between the OIRA and PIRA, that occurred 
from 1970 onwards was markedly different. Republicans were fragmented into two distinct 
political entities creating new strategic concerns. Foremost among them was the limitation of a 
rival organisation’s activities. In addition to this, each organisation sought to create, and fill, 
voids of authority left behind by the recession of the regional, and central, power. Violence, in 
 
39 Prince and Warner, ‘The IRA and its Rivals’, 282-3.  
40 Ruairí Ó Brádaigh referred to opponents marking and moving into ‘positions of influence’, see 
Brendan O’Brien, The Long War: The IRA & Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1999), 111.  
41 This terminology is specifically found in Marisa McGlinchey, Unfinished Business: The Politics of 
‘Dissident’ Irish Republicanism (Manchester, 2019), 38.  
42 Centralisation denotes the concentration of power.  
 8 
 
this context, was increasingly used as a means of authoritative extension and retention. The 
violence varied in type, the most used and effective being an intrusive form of violence which 
sought to forcefully convey a message.43 This inwards violence was paralleled by increasing 
outwards violence as each organisation sought to be heard above the other.44  
In sum, this dissertation traces the changing competitive strategies adopted by republicans in 
competition with one another. It argues that contextual shifts altered the utility and availability 
of certain non-violent and violent strategies. So, while Sean Swan may have rightly argued that 
‘violence was always a potential factor in republican political disputes’, I go further in attempting 
to identify the specific triggers.45 In doing this, I am adopting the ground-breaking work of 
political scientists, Erica Chenoweth and Adria Lawrence, which emphasises that violence is a 
choice, not an outcome, and is not simply dichotomously absent or present. Instead, as they 
urge, we must recognise the diversity of strategic options available to operators in particular 
moments, and ‘unpack’ both non-violent and violent strategies accordingly.46 This forces us, 
quite rightly as historians, to consider the alternative courses of action that were planned, and 
given a certain degree of preference, but never achieved or enacted; ‘plan As’, so to speak, were 
rarely fully accomplished, and more often than not ‘plan Bs’ were settled for. Still further, this 
piece notes the competitive limits placed upon republican women as a result of the cultural 
mould of patriarchal militarism. Their ability to influence the IRA’s direction was infringed by 
their institutional subordination and cultural marginality. 
IV 
Sources: Separating the Competition from the History 
The competition between republicans has not ended; it continues through new mediums, one 
of those being the secondary literature itself. The source material, therefore, presents a problem 
which must be methodologically confronted by the historian. In his review article of the recent 
work released on the IRA, Ian McBride noted a most ‘bizarre twist’ in the literature he had 
surveyed. It was not unionists, or even revisionist historians, that had generated the moral 
critique of the PIRA’s armed struggle, it was rival republicans. The specific literature that 
McBride had reviewed was the work of journalist Ed Moloney and terrorist studies expert 
Rogelio Alonso, who had both gained unprecedented access into the clandestine world of Irish 
 
43 Violence here is understood as the deliberate infliction of harm. For a discussion of violence as a 
function of control, see Kalyvas, Logic of Violence, 19, 26.  
44 Prince and Warner, ‘The IRA and its Rivals’, 276, 283.  
45 Sean Swan, Official Irish Republicanism, 1962 to 1972 (Lulu, 2008), 118.  
46 Adria Lawrence and Erica Chenoweth, ‘Introduction’, in Erica Chenoweth and Adria Lawrence (eds.), 
Rethinking Violence: States and Non-State Actors in Conflict (Cambridge, 2010), 1-19. 
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republicanism through the collection of extensive interview material.47 However, McBride 
noticed a trend, unmentioned or tackled by those authors, ‘Moloney’s anonymous sources 
include a disproportionate number of disgruntled militants, cast aside as Adams and 
McGuinness steered the Provisionals toward compromise. Alonso’s emphases bear the 
fingerprints of the Official IRA… now exacting their literary revenge.’48 It, thus, becomes 
increasingly difficult to tell whether these historical accounts are separate from or a part of the 
competition itself.  
There is, then, a real danger that scholarly literature on Irish republicanism will merely be an 
extension of the competition. The issue arises as a result of scholarly entanglement and a 
parochial source base. Irish republican conflicts were not confined to the backstreets of Belfast 
or the backrooms of pubs, they sought to use external actors as tools to strengthen their internal 
and inter-organisational position. Moloney, who had operated as a journalist during the 
Troubles, was, as he has himself recorded, used by a republican element within the PIRA 
commonly referred to as the younger Northerners. He was to later realise that their motive had 
been to indirectly denounce their southern-based internal rivals publicly, while keeping a safe 
distance from the action.49  
This manipulation has clearly left an indelible mark on Moloney, whose ‘secret history’ is 
concerned, first and foremost, with the rise of this element, and their leader Gerry Adams. 
McBride was left with the impression after reading Moloney’s investigative work that Adams 
was a ‘mastermind’ and ‘remarkable puppet-master’ whose ‘hidden hand’ dictated the course 
of the republican campaign at every significant turn, from beginning till end.50 There is no 
doubting that Adams was a key player, the point being raised here is that the narrative produced 
by Moloney is difficult to disentangle from the dissident counter-narrative of British imperialistic 
manipulation. Moloney’s following comment reinforces my point, ‘while Adams and his people 
were prepared to break the rules to advance their agenda, Ó Brádaigh believed in playing by the 
rules, even though they might damage his interests’, ‘Ruairí Ó Brádaigh can thus be said to be 
the last, or one of the last, Irish Republicans.’51 The story given is a typical colonial one. The ‘last 
of the republicans’ are left marginalised, and few in number, while the traitors, now 
 
47 Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (London, 2007); Rogelio Alonso, The IRA and Armed Struggle 
(Abingdon, 2007).  
48 Ian McBride, ‘The Shadow of the Gunman: Irish Historians and the IRA’, Journal of Contemporary 
History, 46 (2011), 709.  
49 See the foreword by Moloney to Robert White, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh: The Life and Politics of an Irish 
Revolutionary (Bloomington, 2006), xiii- xvii.  
50 McBride, ‘Shadow of the Gunman’, 702-3.  
51 White, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, xvii.  
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indistinguishable from the imperialist, are all powerful.52 We can only properly move away from 
competitive accounts by writing a history of the competition itself.  
This thesis has attempted, within the realms of possibility, to use a wide range of primary 
material including: a limited number of republican documents, newspapers, memoirs, second-
hand interview material, and a significant number of archival documents. It must be 
emphatically stated that republican organisations were clandestine in nature. Memoirs, 
interview material, and British intelligence reports, promise the reader the prospect of a ‘secret 
entrance’ into a clandestine world. Secondary accounts based on new interview material are 
sold as ‘secret’ histories; the dusk jackets of memoirs are emblazoned with revelatory terms 
such as ‘UNCENSORED’; and the sight of a bold lettered ‘SECRET’ stamped on an intelligence 
report can make the researcher feel as if they are ‘behind the scenes’.53 This terminology, 
however, works to give the material a level of automatic receptiveness. In recognising this, 
McBride and Stephen Hopkins have been foremost in stressing the need to approach memoirs 
with their contextual background in mind; emphasising authorial incentive, the influence of 
commercial-minded publishers, and the competing republican narratives that structure such 
accounts.54 With regard to intelligence material, operators on the ground were continually 
assessing the validity of information garnered; they came to trust some contacts, regarding them 
as ‘reliable’, while deeming others suspect. British intelligence came from multiple sources, such 
as surveillance, captured documents, vigilant soldiers, contacts, informers, paramilitaries, prison 
officials, and the special branch of the provincial police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(RUC).55 The underlying theme here is one of uncertainty, which, crucially, contradicts our 
distorted present-day view of the past as being a certainty. This ties in with the approach to 
history forwarded by Roy Foster which appreciates the fact that past actors were faced with 
‘uncertain futures’.56 We often forget that the past was at one time a present.  
 
 
 
 
52 The classic example being James Fenimore Cooper, Last of the Mohicans (London, 1986).  
53 Moloney, Secret History; Gerry Bradley and Brian Feeney, Insider: Gerry Bradley’s Life in the IRA 
(Dublin, 2009).  
54 Ian McBride, ‘Provisional Truths: IRA Memoirs and the Peace Process’, in Senia Pašeta (ed.), Uncertain 
Futures: Essays about the Irish Past for Royster (Oxford, 2016), 235-247; Stephen Hopkins, The Politics of 
Memoir and the Northern Ireland Conflict (Liverpool, 2013),1-50.  
55 The British forces in raids often found documentation belonging to the paramilitaries, TNA, WO 
305/4599/3, 39 Brigade INTSUM, 28 October 1971.  
56 Senia Pašeta (ed.) Uncertain Futures: Essays about the Irish Past for Roy Foster (Oxford, 2016).  
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V 
Road Map 
The journey ahead is not a straightforward one; it is, therefore, necessary that I map out the 
historical roads that follow. The thesis has been broken down into three chapters containing 
thematic sub-sections. Chapter 1, entitled ‘The Source, Language, and Logic of the Competition’, 
seeks to provide the reader with a much-needed preparatory discussion of the foundations of 
the competition. It encompasses the whole chronological period under study so as to lay out the 
variant republicanism(s) formed during this period, the sub-culture of Irish republicanism, and 
why republicans felt it logical to remain and compete within an organisation despite the 
realisation of internal divisions. With this completed, chapter 2, entitled ‘Internal Competition 
within the IRA, 1965-9’, traces the competitive moves made by rival internal teams who sought 
to maximise their control over that vehicle. These are unpacked to show how institutionalised 
competition offered competitors an array of peaceful manoeuvres that meant violence, or the 
threat of it, was rarely adopted. Furthermore, while both factions possessed the ability to block 
any changes of direction the option of splitting was relegated. However, once one team 
managed to secure a ‘game changer’ in 1968, allowing them to change the direction of that 
vehicle, the resultant competitive moves planned and enacted by the losing faction(s) became 
more desperate. They were in the end, forced to go with ‘plan B’, that being to split.  
The split, in severely fragmenting republican politics, changed the nature of the competition. 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the dynamics of the inter-organisational competition between the 
OIRA and PIRA. It revisits the Sinn Fein walkout of 11 January 1970 and questions the 
‘inevitability’ of that event. The central contention being that the expected walkout did not 
materialise. The discussion then moves on to the competing narratives produced by the rival 
organisations as they engaged in a ‘meta-conflict’.57 Following this is a discussion of outwards 
violence, which was being competitively driven as each organisation sought to raise the volume 
of their actions. This sub-section works principally with evidence found within the archival files. 
As does the final sub-section on inwards violence, which identifies a number of patterns that 
emerge from the British intelligence reports. It finds that moments of contestation and shifts in 
territorial control triggered at least some of the republican violence. Other competitive means 
are also noted, such as the provision of services through the opening of shops. To conclude, the 
civil war in Northern Ireland is analogised as an entangled ball of wool.  
 
57 Ian McBride, ‘The Truth about the Troubles’, in Jim Smyth (ed.), Remembering the Troubles: 
Contesting the Recent Past in Northern Ireland (Notre Dame, 2017), 14.  
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Chapter 1: The Source, Language, and Logic of the Competition 
I  
The Source 
Politics is a distinct form of human activity that, at its core, is concerned with determining the 
common life within a given social remit. In comparison to culture, politics is a most conscious 
activity. Cultural games are often ingrained in one’s youth through a process of socialisation, 
producing what the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls the habitus: a wired, unconscious, feeling 
for the game. In different cultural settings, our habitus determines the most valuable actions to 
be deployed.58 In contrast, political action presupposes conscious thought. Political ideas are 
produced via engagement with particular intellectual debates of the time.59 Strategies are then 
formulated and deployed in a number of settings, ranging from cabinet rooms to the street.60  
Ideas are not neatly bound concepts; they are topics of continual debate. Irish republicanism 
was likewise debated and revised as the context changed. Henry Patterson was one of the first 
to stress, in an analysis of what he termed ‘social republicanism’, that ‘a more discontinuous, 
“conjunctural” analysis’ was needed.61  At the primary level, British officials developed an acute 
awareness of the divisive nature of Irish republicanism. Merlyn Rees, Northern Ireland Secretary 
of State between 1974-6, in a paper submitted to the Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, 
stated that ‘the Provisional Army Council is not a homogenous entity with a single view…’.62 
What is witnessed in the primary material are heterogenous Irish republicanism(s). The 
qualitative differences relating to the degree, and form, of positivity. Two distinct republican 
approaches were held between 1965-72: a Marxist republican approach and an independence-
focused republicanism. While all republicans shared the belief that an all-Ireland democracy was 
righteous, the form it would take, and the processes involved in reaching that end destination 
were conflicting.63  
 
58 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice 
(Abingdon, 2010), 165-171. 
59 For political ideas as interventions in pre-existing intellectual debates see Quentin Skinner, From 
Humanism to Hobbes: Studies in Rhetoric and Politics (Cambridge, 2018), 1-11.  
60 Prince, ‘Against Ethnicity’, 784-5.  
61 By ‘social republicanism’ Patterson meant the taking up of economic and social issues so as to rally the 
masses to the ‘anti-imperialist’ struggle. See Henry Patterson, The Politics of Illusion: A Political History 
of the IRA (London, 1997), 12. 
62 TNA, Ministry of Defence (DEFE) 70/637, Letter from Lieutenant General to Chief of the General Staff, 
Annex A, 30 December 1974.  
63 McGuire, To Take Arms, 70.  
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To best understand these internal divisions, we need to rewind a little to the end of the failed 
Border Campaign. In early 1962, having been rendered militarily obsolete by the security forces 
North and South of the border, the IRA leadership in a public declaration announced its cessation 
of violence highlighting a number of factors contributing to its failure. At the top of that list, was 
public support: 
‘Foremost among the factors motivating this course of action has been the 
attitude of the general public whose minds have been deliberately distracted 
from the supreme issues facing the Irish people- the unity and freedom of 
Ireland.’64 
The implication here being that an elitist military struggle, detached from the people, had no 
hope of success. In consequently searching for an injection of positivity, the leadership were to 
conceptualise different republicanisms. The journalists Patrick Bishop and Eamon Mallie 
captured the essence of this revision best when they wrote, the dispute ‘did not concern the 
desirability of developing a new political formula. It concerned the nature of the recipe and the 
proportions of the ingredients it contained.’65  
All Irish republicans viewed the situation in Ireland as a colonial one. Britain, its imperialist 
neighbour, was said to utilise the classic method of divide and rule to dominate Ireland. Official 
Sinn Fein, in February 1970, released the following statement: ‘Britain has always lived well off 
our differences and intends continuing on doing so in the future… join us in condemning this 
British tactic of divide and conquer.’66 The partition, under the Government of Ireland Act in 
1920, and the communal divisions in the North, premised upon an ascendant Protestant class, 
were considered to be manifestations of imperialistic manipulation. The Free state government 
was deemed a neo-colonial one, economically controlled and exploited by capitalistic 
enterprise, while the North remained an occupied territory.67 In their belief that the obstacle to 
an all-Ireland democracy was British imperialism, their political formulations were concerned 
with combatting the artificial divisions supposedly created by that force. The means conceived 
in which to overcome these divisions were highly divergent.  
One positive formulation espoused by 1960s, and later OIRA, leaders, Cathal Goulding, Seamus 
Costello, and Garland, derived from the positive definition of freedom offered by Marxism. The 
 
64 TNA, WO 305/1799, 39 Brigade Intelligence Liaison Letter, 5 March 1962.  
65 Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, The Provisional IRA (London, 1987), 49.  
66 TNA, FCO 33/1197, Press Extract, Press Release from Sinn Fein, 2 February 1970. 
67 This was outlined clearly in a policy document produced in 1969, Ireland Today, March 1969, 2-7.  The 
Southern state was not always judged as illegitimate, Liam Kelly’s splinter group, Saor Uladh, accepted 
the 1937 Irish constitution. For a thorough analysis of imperialism see Richard Bourke, ‘”Imperialism” 
and “Democracy” in Modern Ireland 1898-2002’, Boundary 2, 31 (2004), 93-118.  
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theoretical foundations of this Marxist republican approach were introduced by the intellectual 
Roy Johnston, who was instrumentally invited into the IRA by Goulding, who had become C/S 
after the ceasefire of 1962.68 Johnston had, in the early 1960s, been a member of the Connolly 
Association in London, headed by James Connolly biographer Desmond Greaves, and was to 
become a prominent figure within the Wolfe Tone Societies set up in 1963. The presence of 
these republican intellectuals, as Richard English has asserted, contributed to the civil rights 
campaign in Northern Ireland.69 This move towards political agitation was underpinned by the 
Marxist belief, derived from Hegelian philosophy, that true freedom was the realisation of one’s 
real interests, those interests being socio-economic ones. Agitation was necessary to stir the 
class consciousness of the people of no property, the working class. These republicans were, 
therefore, ‘striving towards reality’.70 A whole raft of agitational measures were endorsed by 
them including industrial strike action, attacks on multi-national companies, and housing 
protests.71 In addition, many Marxist Republicans, especially Costello, felt that the age-old 
abstentionist policy, that prevented Sinn Fein candidates from taking their seats in the 
partitionist parliaments, needed to be jettisoned if they were to agitate in every possible political 
space. The insularity of republicanism would be further reversed by an alliance with other radical 
left-wing political groups in a National Liberation Front (NLF).72 This was not simply a 
combination of new tactics; it was a distinct ideological approach that fused together Irish 
republicanism and Marxism.73  
The Marxist republicans, crucially, believed that unification would have to precede 
independence. This radically altered the ideal timing of an armed campaign.74 The position was 
summed up best by Goulding in his Drogheda oration of August 1965: ‘the only way to rid this 
country of an armed British force is to confront them with an armed force of Irishmen back(ed) 
by a united Irish people’.75 That unity was premised upon the workers of Ireland; it was this 
subaltern class that would play the ‘leading role’ in the revolution.76 The end democratic goal 
 
68 Patterson, Politics of Illusion, 99.  
69 The key word here being contribution. Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA 
(London, 2012), 85-91. 
70 Found in Liam McMillen: Separatist, Socialist, Republican ([Official] Sinn Fein, 1976), 8.  
71 Liam Cullinane, ‘”A happy blend”? Irish republicanism, political violence and social agitation, 1962- 
69’, Saothar, 35 (2010), 49-65. 
72 Ibid. 188-9, 242-44.  
73 The agenda for a special commission, drawn up by Johnston, in 1969 was ‘not abstentionism but 
acceptance or otherwise of Irish Marxism’. Swan, Official Irish Republicanism, 225. 
74 Militancy was not jettisoned see Brian Hanley, ‘”Agitate, Educate, Organise”: The IRA’s “An tOglach”, 
1965-68’, Saothar, 32 (2008), 51-62.  
75 United Irishman, September 1965. 
76 Gerry Foley, Ireland in Rebellion (London, 1972), 22.  
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was refined to a socialist democratic republic which was to be controlled by the majority class, 
the workers.77 In a 1975 interview, Goulding legitimated Irish socialism in the following terms: 
‘Socialism is a philosophy for me, it’s a science which means in fact the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number’.78 Driven by this democratic righteousness, they believed that the 
imperialistic manufactured social divisions would be transcended by the realisation of true 
freedom. The false consciousness of communal affiliation would be dissolved, and class 
identification would be promoted. Only at the point at which class unity was reached could a 
successful independence struggle then be accomplished.  
This staged class struggle for freedom was not accepted by independence-focused republicans, 
such as Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, Dave O’Connell, and MacStíofáin. For them, the source of the division, 
the divider, had to be removed first before national unity could be realistically accomplished. 
Like the Marxist republicans, they gave little autonomy to unionism, viewing it as a product of 
imperialistic manipulation. For them, the true unit of democratic decision was the Irish nation. 
In an interview, in March 1972, Ó Brádaigh adressed the issue of unity, ‘Once the prop of the 
Northern state in the form of the British presence is removed things will find their own level.’79 
Unionism was not the obstacle; it was instead a blind fold, that would perish with the 
accomplishment of independence. Their task was to free Ireland so that could it then unite. This 
ordering of the ends mattered greatly for it meant that a military campaign was an essential and 
immediate necessity.80 They believed entrance into constitutional politics would side-track Irish 
republicans down a dead-end of parliamentary politics and an abandonment of revolutionary 
struggle.81 These independence-focused republicans were, however, divided over the perceived 
effectiveness of non-violent methods.  
The independent-oriented republican approach can be broken into two strands, positive and 
negative. The positive independents, foremost among them Ó Brádaigh, his brother Sean, and 
O’Connell, saw themselves as socialist republicans.82 The struggle, for them, was not simply a 
negative one, concerned solely with fighting against something, they believed in fighting for a 
new Ireland, Eire Nua. They, therefore, sought to complexify what a united Ireland would look 
 
77 Swan, Official Irish Republicanism, 194-5.  
78 Cathal Goulding: Thinker, Socialist, Republican, Revolutionary, 1923-1998 (Dublin, 1999), 6.  
79 TNA, FCO 87/2, Press Extract, Interview of Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, President of Sinn Fein, by Keith Kyle, 7 
March 1972.  
80 Robert White, Out of the Ashes: An Oral History of The Provisional Irish Republican Movement 
(NewBridge, 2017), 49. 
81 Ibid. 69-70.  
82 White, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, 120-1, 136.  
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like, and this materialised within the re-examination of the 1960s.83 For them, a free Ireland 
would be a socialist society marked by a redistribution of wealth, nationalisation of key 
industries, and the free association of workers in cooperatives. The democratic foundations of 
that new state would be federal, inspired by the canton system of Switzerland. Maximum 
devolution would allow provincial, regional, and local majorities to have a significant say over 
governance. Dail Uladh, the envisioned nine-county parliament of Ulster, would allow unionists 
to retain a slim provincial majority.84 For this republican sub-section, the military and political 
had to be balanced, they could not afford to be marginalised to the periphery, they had to 
occupy a central place in political discussions over Ireland’s future.85 With this in mind, the 
struggle for them needed to be multifaceted; alongside the military, elections would be 
contested on an abstentionist stance, Eire Nua publicised, anti-EEC campaigns would be 
mounted, and co-operatives promoted.86  
In contrast, some republicans saw ‘political’ activity as distractive and ineffective. MacStíofáin 
was to become a proponent of this mono-focused militaristic approach allied to key veteran 
Belfast militants, such as Seamus Twomey.87 This approach was encapsulated by Jimmy Steele’s 
vociferous July 1969 Mullingar Oration, ‘…the only methods that will ever succeed, not the 
method of the politicians nor the constitutionalists, but the method of soldiers, the method of 
armed force…’88 Force had been used to establish the imperial hold over Ireland and by these 
means it would be freed. In a private conversation, in May 1972, Miles Shevlin, an important 
Provisional, disclosed that the PIRA ‘was not interested in seeking public support of any kind for 
our actions’, the British ‘exploiters’ had to ‘be driven out’.89  A ‘traditionalist’ faction did not 
form the leadership of the 1969 splinter group, the PIRA, rather it was a ‘coalition’ between 
those who agreed on the necessity of an immediate armed campaign.90 
The sheer ambiguity of Irish republicanism is revealed by the above discussion. The distinctive 
approaches all sought to direct the revolutionary vehicle along divergent paths. These divisions, 
 
83 Eire Nua, the social and economic programme, had been formulated in the mid-1960s as part of an 
attempt to offer a credible alternative. See Brian Hanley and Scott Millar, The Lost Revolution (Dublin, 
2009), 79.  
84 Eire Nua: The Social and Economic Programme of Sinn Fein ([Provisional] Sinn Fein, 1971). An 
appendix was added in June 1972, setting out the prospective governmental structure.  
85 McGuire, To Take Arms, 32-33, 112. Confirmed by secret channel of information found in TNA, FCO 
87/4, NIO London Telegram No. 33.  
86 White, Out of the Ashes, 64.  
87 TNA, DEFE 11/789, HQ Northern Ireland INTSUM, 20 April 1972.  
88 Taylor, Provos, 45-46. 
89 TNA, FCO 87/3, Record of P.J.C. Evans with Miles Shevlin, 25 May 1972; TNA, DEFE 24/1933, FCO 
Telegram No. 445.  
90 Ó Faoleán, A Broad Church, 1.  
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most importantly, led to the formation of internal teams who competed for control of the 
steering wheel.  
II 
The Language 
The January 1965 edition of the IRA’s secretive internal organ, An tOglach, stated that ‘the IRA 
needs men, men who are not dreamers, men who are no wasters… In short Real Men’. It then 
asked its readership, the rank-and-file volunteer, ‘what kind of a man are you? Can you truthfully 
call yourself a soldier? More important still can you truthfully call yourself a Revolutionary?’ In 
posing these evaluative questions the journal then probed some of the possible motives behind 
joining the IRA, was it to ‘be in something “tough”?’ or ‘because you want to be a hero’. The 
author concluded that ‘unless you’re nuts’ the fundamental drive was a political one, the 
accomplishment of the ultimate political ideal, a united and free Irish Republic. It exclaimed in a 
most emphatic way that a revolutionary was not synonymous with a soldier, other preparatory 
duties, ‘fighting injustice and inequality’, were necessary before another campaign could be 
launched, and so it pressed the volunteer to ‘GET THIS TECHNICOLOUR FILM OUT OF YOUR MIND 
now, it is unrealistic, stupid, childish.’91 The author of this edition was attempting to convey a 
particular political product, in line with the Marxist Republican view, that agitational activity was 
a prerequisite to any future campaign. The manner in which it was packaged clearly played on a 
number of possible social motives and cultural tropes; the prestigious badge of being a 
‘revolutionary’ could not be worn, it argued, by those immature enough to believe that it was 
simply a case of soldiering. 
In studying revolutionary organisations, the social motives of recruits, and their organisational 
sub-culture, should not be overlooked. Terrorist studies scholar, Max Abrahms, has asserted 
that people participate in such organisations purely for social reasons. His argument is based on 
the natural systems model, devised by Chester Barnard, which drew a line between the 
organisation’s goals and those of its members. Instead members are said to participate for 
personal inducements: a sense of solidarity, challenges, excitement, and above all friendship. In 
arguing this position, Abrahms was discrediting the strategic model which, in short, placed 
emphasis on political considerations.92 Despite his iconoclastic attempt, Abrahms has not 
managed to overturn the strategic model, rather, as Chenoweth, Nicholas Miller, and Elizabeth 
 
91 Hanley, ‘The IRA’s “An tOglach”’, 51.  
92 Max Abrahms, ‘What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy’, 
International Security, 32 (2008), 80, 94-5, 100-1.  
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McClellan, have responded, the intervention has shown that scholars need to take more 
seriously the often-complicated interests of the rank-and-file.93 Emphasis is now placed on a 
multiplicity of motives, political and social.94  
In order to sell a republican political product, it had to be marketed in a revolutionary way. 
Republican leaders were clearly conscious of this as they often sought to convince their audience 
by presenting their particular revolution as the path of greatest resistance (see figure 1). 
Goulding, in his Bodenstown oration of 1967, unveiled a revolutionary mountain which could 
only be surmounted by those possessing a revolutionary resolve. The ‘gruelling work’ of 
organised resistance, he said, would separate the revolutionaries from the romantics. 
Lambasting the romantics as follows:  
‘It isn’t easy to admit to one’s self that one is tired, that others must come 
forward. It isn’t easy to state that one hankers for a quick, glory-full military 
victory with none of the painful, slow, gruelling work necessary to create the 
situation where we can grasp this victory. This is not any longer a movement 
for dream-filled romantics… This movement has room only for revolutionaries, 
for radicals, for men with a sense of urgent purpose who are aware of 
realities…’95  
Goulding knew that the mountainous task ahead, while terrifying at first, would delight those 
looking for a challenge. In rhetorical terms, he was attempting to move republicans over to his 
side of the debate. Simply outlining his Marxist republican blueprint was unlikely to win people 
over, he had to engage them by asking ‘were you up to the task?’. According to Adams, Goulding 
managed to at least win over one person that day, the young Belfast republican, Joe McCann, 
who ‘was quite taken by it’.96  
One recurrent theme in this republican rhetoric is gender. More precisely, the claim that 
becoming a revolutionary was something only ‘real men’ could accomplish. The concept of 
patriarchal militarism envisaged men saving women. This understanding was inherited from the 
early twentieth century. For example, the cartoonist Gordon Brewster in 1919 drew the Irish 
nation as a woman deprived of her ‘place in the sun’ by the menacing English lion (see Figure 2). 
The image was replicated in republican propaganda during the 1960s and 70s. More specifically, 
Ireland was depicted as a mother in need of saving. The first 1971 edition of Republican News 
 
93 Erica Chenoweth, Nicholas Miller, Elizabeth McClellan, Hillel Frisch, Paul Staniland, Max Abrahms, 
‘What Makes Terrorists Tick’, International Security, 33 (2009), 186.  
94 Richard English, Does Terrorism Work? A History (Oxford, 2016), 36-8, 111, 142.  
95 United Irishman, July 1967. Some years later, in interview, Ó Brádaigh was to invert the language, 
saying that Goulding should have walked away, ‘if you’re tired, Jesus, like, just opt out’. White, Out of 
the Ashes, 65.  
96 Gerry Adams, Before the Dawn: An Autobiography (Dublin, 2017), 82.  
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contained a lengthy article entitled ‘Mother Ireland’, who was stranded and in need of rescue, 
and it ended with the following: ‘So let my pleas be heard- give my children back to me...’.97 A 
subsequent edition was to stress the supportive role that republican women were to play, ‘We 
believe in the ideals of our men. We follow them where they lead giving support and help at all 
times and in all places.’98 This cultural mould also stemmed from the late nineteenth century 
attempt to define ‘true womanhood’. As shown by Edwin Coomasaru’s research, ‘true 
womanhood’ was encapsulated in the figure of the ‘handmaiden’, clean, domestic-bound, and 
caregiving. Social change was to occur during the Troubles, but it was slow.99 As a result, while 
republican women were to fight as volunteers and act as auxiliaries in the Cumann na mBan, 
their internal influence was restricted by cultural marginalisation; the drivers were to be men.   
Internal scrutiny was underpinned by social and cultural definitions. A ‘revolutionary’ was 
understood to be a dedicatory and resolute activist. Signs of individualism were not only 
condemned but viewed as potentially lethal for the revolutionary organisation; any elitist 
politician could, it was held, easily be seduced by the prospect of self-promotion.100 Gerry 
Brannigan, under the pseudonym Vindicator, was to address this very theme in a February 1976 
article. He wrote ‘The “personality cult” (or self-promotion), is symptomatic of the ‘professional 
politician’ who tends to view the political situation in terms of personal gain, rather than the 
overall objectives of the organisation to which he belongs, and is a characteristic easily exploited 
by imperialistic and capitalistic interests.’101 Republican leaders were, thus, scrutinized for signs 
of individualism, or for that matter any other weakness that could impede their directive task. 
Alcoholism (drink driving), sexual promiscuity, and lavish expenditure were all possible flaws 
that could be used to discredit and marginalise. This often led to concealment, as recorded by 
ex-Provisional Maria McGuire, PIRA leader O’Connell ‘wasn’t worried by the newspaper reports 
of how many beds had been used, so long as they didn’t discover all the whiskey bottles 
underneath them!’102 Not only was the IRA a secret to the outside world but its members had 
to keep personal secrets from one another, or risk being discredited. 
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Figure 1: The goliath task facing republicans. Republican News, May 1971. 
 
Figure 2: Ireland deprived of her place in the sun. Evening Herald, 24 August 1919. 
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III 
The Logic 
Internal divisions are often presented as the cause of splits. This is a most logical explanation; 
highly divergent interests cannot be satisfied within the parameters of one organisation. It is 
maintained that internal fissiparity causes relations to breakdown, and once tensions reach 
breaking-point splintering becomes an ‘inevitable’ outcome.103 This dissertation, however, 
suggests that splintering was a second-rate strategic choice, taken from a position of internal 
weakness. The first-rate course of action was to gain control of that vehicle by playing the 
internal game.  
The breaking-point interpretation lacks a degree of precision as internal divisions were often 
realised long before the, supposedly, destined split was to occur. The answer given to explain 
the conspicuous temporal gap is that overtime tensions were exacerbated, as John F. Morrison 
has entitled it, ‘The tinder piles up’.104 Morrison has provided the most detailed exposition of 
republican organisational splits. He argues that divisions lead to factions; if one faction’s ‘voice’ 
fails to be received then a split becomes inevitable; competition then arises in the form of the 
mutual enticement of supporters in preparation for that destined split.105 Others have also 
stressed the importance of external pressures in exacerbating internal relations.106 This 
explanatory approach presents splits, as is so often done with violence, as a degree of conflict. 
To the contrary, within the IRA, during the 1960s, we see a high degree of tension throughout 
the period, with suspensions, ‘verbal ambushes’, and angry, even violent, thoughts being 
recorded.107 In the case of workability, it was recognised in 1967, by both factions that they had 
‘no movement’, militarily or politically. They had reached a most frustrating stalemate in which 
progress in either direction was being blocked, yet still no split materialised.108 There is much to 
be credited in the current historiography. Morrison has, crucially, broken down splits into phases 
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of activity. While Swan, Brian Hanley and Scott Millar, have undertaken extensive empirical 
research without which the internal picture would be barely viewable. I must stress that I am 
simply offering an alternative reading that employs new political tools of analysis.109  
Political conflicts are fundamentally concerned with control, in the case of intra-organisational 
competition that being the means of control. The political approach, forwarded here, holds that 
the relative levels of control held by competing internal teams changed the preferentiality of 
splitting as a strategic choice. In other words, splintering was always an option, its adoption, 
however, depended on the calculated effectiveness and availability of other strategies. 
Splintering, as will be shown below, was a risky move that had failed consistently in the past. 
Republicans learnt from this splinter group history and relegated the choice of splintering. This 
explains why in 1967 the factions decided to remain within the same organisation as they both 
possessed negative control, and the possibility of obtaining positive control, for both parties, 
was still very much open.110 Splits are, therefore, indicative of centralisation; the competitive 
process ends with one team obtaining the means of control, while the losing team is faced with 
the prospect of a difficult choice between internal marginality, an admittance of defeat by 
accepting the rival approach, or salvaging some control with the formation of a competitor 
vehicle. 111  
Upon the realisation of divisions, internal, as opposed to schismatic, strategies were formulated. 
In 1965, following a number of policy proposals, including the end of abstentionism, it was 
recognised by MacStíofáin that a divide had emerged internally, his response, as he later 
recalled, was a most calculating one, ‘I was hopeful that we could retain a majority opposed to 
the policy changes that were being pushed. And I was confident about how to do it.’112 To 
successfully compete a plan was required.   
The logic of playing the internal game was derived from republican history. The obsolescence of 
splinter groups, present and past, was noted by leading republicans. For Goulding, the failure of 
the Republican Congress initiative of the 1930s, formulated by Peadar O’Donnell and George 
Gilmore, rested with the decision to move outside the IRA.113 As a consequence of this reading, 
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Goulding is said to have shown a most blasé attitude to the 1969 split, commenting that splits 
had never really worked in the past.114 In fact, this sceptical approach to moving outside the 
‘official’ republican organisation was shared by Goulding’s republican rivals, MacStíofáin, and 
veteran Belfast republican Joe Cahill. MacStíofáin, in a later interview, stated, ‘I didn’t want to 
split the movement… they (Goulding and co.) could have shaken hands with us and said… we’re 
leaving to set up our own organisation’.115 In essence, MacStíofáin would have preferred his 
rivals to have formed a breakaway organisation. Still further, Cahill after resigning from the IRA, 
in the mid-1960s, came to regret his decision: 
‘I believe(d) that if I resigned from the movement I could draw attention to what 
was happening. The opposite was the effect and I became completely isolated… 
I realise with hindsight that the only way to bring about change was from within 
the ranks of the movement.’116  
The rationale here being that if you chose not to play, you stood no chance of winning, whereas 
if you chose to compete inter-organisationally, you stood little chance of winning.  
This reinforces the validity of comments made by Marxist republicans that they welcomed the 
prospect of the 1969 split, so long as they were not the ones splintering.117 Splinter groups of 
the past, most notably Republican Congress and Saor Uladh, were localised, ill-funded, and 
ultimately short-lived. The two splinter groups in operation during the 1960s, a Cork-based Irish 
Revolutionary Force and a Dublin-based Saor Eire, were peripheral actors, with the latter 
principally concerned with robbing banks.118 The success of the PIRA between 1970-72 stands 
out as an outlier in a trend of splinter group failures. This success, without doubt, has much to 
do with the degree of that split and the unique context in Northern Ireland during that period. 
The republican players of the 1960s acted as they did in the belief that splits were a second-rate 
strategic choice, a ‘plan B’, the preference was to always play, and win, the internal game.  
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Chapter 2: Internal Competition within the IRA, 1965-9 
I 
Keeping Score 
Political winners and losers are distinguishable by their relative levels of authoritative control. 
The strategic acquisition of control must, therefore, occupy the political actor’s attention. In 
contemplating the prerequisites to political success, Cabral envisaged politics as a game 
comparable to that of a football match:  
‘Each one can preserve his personality, his ideas, his religion, his personal 
problems, even a little of his style of play, but they must obey one thing: they 
must act together to score goals against any opponent with whom they are 
playing…’.119  
The IRA was itself a political field in which contests for control could materialise. The 
predominant form of republican competition in the period 1965-9 was marked by its 
institutional nature. Localised splinter groups were active during this period, but their small size 
meant that the degree of republican fragmentation was limited. Most republicans were engaged 
in the internal competition taking place within the IRA. It is this form of competition that this 
chapter is concerned with.  
The structure of the IRA was a tiered democracy. Every two years, in peacetime, a General Army 
Convention was held comprising delegates sent from units across the island. The delegates 
present elected an Army Executive of twelve who in turn selected a seven-member Army 
Council, the supreme leadership.120 The C/S was chosen from among, and by, the seven council 
members. Once appointed the C/S hand-picked a General Headquarters (GHQ) team which 
acted as the administrative unit; divisional roles relating to publicity, intelligence, and 
procurement were filled. Crucially, the C/S also had a significant say over the appointment of 
local commanders (O/Cs). Sinn Fein, the subordinate political wing, was a metaphorical trailer 
that followed and supported the direction taken by the IRA. There was significant cross-
organisational membership here and any notable divergence was neutralised through IRA 
infiltration. Sinn Fein was likewise headed by a High Council, Ard Chomhairle, that consisted of 
fifteen members who were elected at annual conventions, known as Ard Fheis. Local branches, 
Cumann or Clubs, engaged in local political activism. The role of women was confined to Sinn 
Fein and the auxiliary organisation, Cumann na mBan, until late 1968 when they were allowed 
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to join the IRA. However, throughout the period the key leadership positions, the Army Council, 
GHQ, and local brigade staff, were to be dominated by men.121  
The aim of the internal game was to secure positions of influence, principally Army Council seats, 
so as to determine the direction taken. In order to do this a process of authoritative 
displacement was necessary. This displacement encompassed two phases. The first comprised 
the creation of authoritative voids through marginalisation or structural changes. While the 
secondary phase of centralisation involved filling those spaces with allies of a similar republican 
persuasion so as to maximise control. The possible methods uncovered were as follows: 
marginalisation,122 structural changes,123 ‘turning’,124 ‘conventional’ moves,125 external help and 
interference,126 and, finally, coup d’états and the use, or threat of, physical force.127  
For the period 1965-9, a number of strategic phases are detectable. Marginalisation techniques 
of suspension, expulsion, and discredit, coupled with several turning attempts, were deployed 
in the hope of shifting the power balance. By 1967, however, these moves had proven 
ineffective as rivals became adept at defensive measures rendering the republican vehicle 
directionless.128 This stalemate scenario led to the design and adoption of new competitive 
strategies. The winning move came in 1968 with calculated ‘democratisation’ motions being 
forwarded and passed in both the Army Convention and Ard Fheis of that year. This led to a shift 
in control, in favour of the Marxist republicans, allowing them to finally change the direction. In 
response, the independence-focused republicans were forced to formulate a number of last-
ditch strategies consisting of a compromise deal, a planned coup, and schism. The specific ‘styles 
of play’ varied between and within the competing teams.   
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With this competitive framework in mind, the micro-dynamics of the game can now be explored. 
In 1965, the Ard Chomhairle was faced with ten policy proposals formulated by a special 
conference that had been tasked with re-examination. It had been agreed by a joint meeting of 
IRA and Sinn Fein leaders that the Ard Chomhairle would discuss each proposal with the 
intention of recommending, amending or rejecting it. The assessment occurred over three 
meetings between April and May. Some of the proposals were clearly concerned with the 
insularity of the IRA and Sinn Fein. The most important in this regard was the ninth, the anti-
abstentionist proposal. The recorded minutes, accessed by Swan, show that following a ‘long 
debate’ it was proposed that the ‘Ard Chomhairle give no direction to the Ard Fheis’. This was 
to be defeated by a vote and instead the Ard Chomhairle recommended the rejection of this 
most contentious motion.129 This episode offers us an insight into the nuts and bolts of political 
practice. The extended debate on the policy would have allowed the participants to assess the 
mood in the room. By bringing together circumstantial and historical information they could 
estimate voting patterns. Those who favoured the motion to drop abstentionism, most notably 
Costello, had evidently reached the conclusion that a positive response was unlikely. In that 
situation, the best they could hope for was a neutral response that would allow the membership 
to decide without recommendation. The leadership stamp of approval was all important in 
influencing the decisions reached at conventions, especially on a constitutional issue.130 
The policy document was to trigger a dispute within, and a phase of internal contestation was 
to begin. Goulding, in a reflective interview, identified 1965 as the year in which discussions had 
ended and standpoints were made. To raise political awareness, he believed that they needed 
to extend their ‘guerrilla activities and tactics into the very Parliament itself’. He, however, 
understood the importance of the leadership recommendations in altering the receptiveness of 
the policies, ‘The Army Council called a special convention of the IRA and recommended 
acceptance of the first eight points and that the ninth be rejected.’131 The special conventions of 
both the IRA and Sinn Fein had been called for June; by May Goulding knew that the likelihood 
of the key anti-abstentionist motion being passed was slim. The Marxist Republicans were 
immediately on the back-foot. Alert to the likelihood of contestation, Goulding attempted to 
delay the match in a pre-convention message:  
‘To the volunteers of long service to the Army and Republic I would address a special 
word. Think well on these recommendations… Recommendation number nine 
raises the burning question of entering Leinster House… With this recommendation 
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in particular, an unemotional attitude is essential… You will debate this question 
with comrades and friends not with enemies.’132  
This call for tolerance and unity crucially acknowledged that former comrades could very well 
become enemies.  
Goulding’s message was to fall on deaf ears. Rival teams were roughly formed, and the first 
offensive was to be mounted by the independence-focused republicans. MacStíofáin, O/C of the 
Cork/South Kerry unit, was elected to the Army Council at the June special convention in which 
a large majority defeated the anti-abstentionist motion. The Council was now evenly split 
between Marxist-oriented republicans and independence-focused republicans; Goulding, 
Costello and Garland were opposed by Ó Brádaigh, MacStíofáin and, most probably Paddy 
Mulcahy, while Tomas Mac Giolla was to shift between the two elements.133 In his first Army 
Council meeting, MacStíofáin audaciously began by proposing that Roy Johnston’s IRA 
membership be rescinded citing General Army Order No.4 which forbade membership to 
communists.134  
In order to best understand this marginalisation attempt, we need to break it down. The first 
point of significance is selection, MacStíofáin had identified ‘where some of the new influence 
was coming from.’135 Johnston had been appointed by Goulding as ‘Political Education Officer’ 
and in March of that year had begun making trips to local units to educate volunteers on 
‘political, economic and social issues.’136 Goulding’s plan to raise political awareness was, 
therefore, dependent on Johnston spreading the message. MacStíofáin had, therefore, 
successfully identified a key link in the Marxist republican chain. The proposal also carried weight 
in that Johnston had been closely associated with the Connolly Association and Communist Party 
of Great Britain while he stayed in London during the early 1960s. MacStíofáin had, thus, 
selected a lower-ranked target with a communist background who presented a considerable 
threat to his brand of republicanism. Any resultant internal investigation or removal would have 
greatly discredited the Marxist republicans giving credence to rumours of communist 
infiltration.137  
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In addition, the time and occasion mattered greatly. MacStíofáin had been appointed to a new 
senior role, and new jobs often require a transitional phase of adaptation. Mick Ryan has written 
that he required a settling in period after his appointment in the early 1960s, ‘My contribution 
in the course of the first year was minimal, because of a lack of experience.’138 The move made 
by MacStíofáin speaks volumes about his forthright character. Ó Brádaigh, his political ally 
throughout the 1960s, had doubts about MacStíofáin’s actions which he found brash and 
confrontational, resulting in hard feelings instead of political success. Ó Brádaigh preferred a 
covert approach, ‘I didn’t tell Goulding of my intentions. Nor would I come out brash like 
MacStíofáin.’139 The audacity of the manoeuvre was part of the act, however, in that its potential 
success partly rested on Goulding being caught off guard and given little time to prepare a 
response.  
The success of Goulding’s improvised rebuttal appears to have surprised MacStíofáin. Goulding 
is said to have retorted, ‘that if the individual in question went, he would go too.’140 This episode 
initially appears a most confusing one, MacStíofáin was opposed to those forwarding the new 
policies and with Goulding being foremost among them his departure would have secured a 
quick victory. MacStíofáin had, however, deliberately targeted a lower-ranking member first in 
that he knew he had ‘a certain amount of support.’141 Goulding’s response was crucially an 
amendment; he added a second clause to the motion so that any vote over Johnston’s IRA future 
by the Council would jointly be a vote of no confidence in the C/S. Goulding, thus, managed to 
swiftly wipe out the support base for that motion and defend his political ally. Johnston, in his 
memoir, confirms that Goulding was acting as a protective shield, ‘Goulding accepted this and 
was prepared to defend me from attacks from the right-wing traditionalist quarter.’142 
MacStíofáin’s first day had not gone to plan.  
To fully appreciate the success of this defensive manoeuvre we can compare it to a similar 
marginalisation effort that occurred in 1960. This earlier attempt targeted the then imprisoned 
C/S Sean Cronin on the supposed grounds that he was a communist and former Free State Army 
executioner. The statement was from Clan na Gael143 and delivered by Paddy McLogan, one of 
the infamous ‘Three Macs’.144 Ryan then a member of the Council, as was Goulding, felt that it 
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was a shameful case of McCarthyism. The response made by Ó Brádaigh, the acting C/S, was to 
suspend the decision for two weeks so as to give consideration to the allegations. In giving 
thought to these claims it gave them a degree of authenticity. The letter was eventually 
dismissed but Cronin upon his release was angry, he reported to the then quartermaster, 
Goulding, that the two-week intermission looked like an internal investigation. Cronin felt that 
even the act of reading the statement at the Council had lent it credence, no acknowledgement 
should have been given. Believing that his reputation had been tarnished Cronin refused any 
renewed leadership position.145 The telling point here is that the handling of such allegations 
could discredit the targeted individual. Goulding may well have learnt from this incident as he 
managed to avoid both forms of marginalisation and, crucially, retained control over education.  
In addition to attacks aimed at Johnston, Denis Foley the editor of the IRA newspaper, United 
Irishman, was being heavily criticized. Foley, a Marxist Republican, had been printing some 
provocative material and had overreached with an editorial in March 1965, entitled ‘Live Horse’. 
It contended that, ‘Every avenue should we feel, be explored; every shackle cast off; every forum 
used…’.146 Forcefully espousing the anti-abstentionist stance so openly while it was still 
constitutionally enshrined was probably unadvised. His fate as editor was sealed, however, by 
the accompanying caricature which ridiculed his opponents by depicting a frightened republican 
holding back his fellow Sinn Fein member from entering a haunted Leinster House (see figure 
3). Sean Ó Brádaigh, in his capacity as a member of the Ard Chomhairle, condemned the 
editorial, questioned the editorship, and had a letter published in the newspaper countering its 
recent publications.147 Significantly, Foley was not dismissed he resigned. Resignations are a 
form of disassociation and sometimes a calculated admittance of wrongdoing. In this case, 
Foley’s resignation individualised the incident; in sporting terms, ‘he took one for the team’. Had 
Foley been reprimanded by the leadership for the article it would have signalled to the 
volunteers that anti-abstentionist arguments warranted demotion. The nuanced argument, that 
it was the manner in which these ideas had been conveyed, would be lost. Foley’s personal 
initiative allowed the Marxist republicans to retain control of the editorship and appoint another 
editor of their choice, that being Tony Meade.148 By the end of 1965, the Marxist republicans 
had managed to retain control of the key internal organs of the IRA: education, the United 
Irishman, and An tOglach.  
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These mediums were to prove vital in changing the makeup of the rank and file. One piece of 
demonstrative evidence will suffice here. A new Dublin recruit of the mid-1960s, Sean Dunne, 
has since recalled his introduction to Irish Republicanism:  
‘A woman knitting in the corner, someone… talking about the abstentionist policy, I 
didn’t know what the abstentionist policy was, I thought it was to do with drink… 
when they said we won’t enter Leinster House… I thought it was a pub… I didn’t find 
out for about a year what they were actually arguing about… I realised that the 
politics I was reading in the United Irishman, which was left-leaning… wasn’t in the 
Cumann I was in…’.149 
Dunne was to become a key IRA figure and proponent of the Marxist republican position so we 
must be careful in taking this account at face-value. Ridicule is a political weapon and his account 
is satirical. Nevertheless, Dunne was clearly attracted by the left-leaning rhetoric being 
propagandised; recruits were reading James Connolly and Soviet histories not simply Tom 
Barry’s Guerrilla Days in Ireland.150 Overtime many volunteers would become increasingly aware 
of the agitational and constitutional political options available to them, and their perception of 
what constituted Irish republicanism would alter.   
In this early phase of contestation, it was still believed that rivals could be converted. This 
contest of persuasion consisted of a rival being isolated for political debate. MacStíofáin 
remembers being repeatedly approached by those who hoped that he would abandon his 
particular republican philosophy. The frequent occurrence of such incidents even led 
MacStíofáin to develop a specific debating technique.151 One such occasion involved Johnston 
attempting to persuade the devout Catholic MacStíofáin of the link between Marxism and 
Christianity by stressing the altruism inherent in each. To reinforce his point Johnston referenced 
the work of Italian communist Pier Paolo Pasolini, whose film based on the gospel according to 
Saint Matthew presented ‘Jesus Christ as a revolutionary in the Roman environment.’152 
MacStíofáin was not to be convinced, ‘After five or six such approaches, these attempts to 
convert me were seen as fruitless, and each group stuck to its own position.’153 The fixation with 
MacStíofáin is explained by his outspoken character. If the Marxists had managed to turn 
MacStíofáin it would have changed the perceived internal score and made a lot of members re-
think their position. With persuasion failing, rivals then turned to pressurisation. MacStíofáin 
appears to have sought to make Johnston’s life as difficult as possible. In a visit to Cork on an 
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educational trip Johnston was made to feel extremely uncomfortable in the presence of local 
leaders MacStíofáin and Gearóid MacCárthaigh describing it as a ‘verbal ambush’.154 In sum, 
influential individuals were being targeted in a highly personable way with the objective of 
extending the authority of one team.  
The sheer extent of this internal scrutiny meant that players were keenly aware of etiquette and 
rules. Playing by the rules mattered, one misplaced step could warrant a suspension or 
expulsion. With this in mind, republican players sought to rile up opponents in the hope that 
their emotions would get the better of them. Once again, MacStíofáin was targeted. In his 
memoir, he states how being in a revolutionary organisation allowed him to develop ‘a certain 
sixth sense about provocateurs and their methods.’ His revolutionary radar detected two 
attempts. One ranking member after weekly GHQ meetings would try to be friendly with 
MacStíofáin and then lambaste the ‘softly, softly’ policies being advocated by certain leaders. 
The second individual, active in Dublin, would lament personal grievances and then go on to 
denounce the Army Council.155 The method here was to try and first establish a personal 
relationship and then use that influence to provoke the rival to make a disloyal criticism. This 
provocateur activity also confused the internal playing field, friend or foe became difficult to 
distinguish.  
Yet sometimes stepping outside the rules was deemed necessary. MacStíofáin was suspended 
in mid-1966 for refusing to distribute an edition of the United Irishman containing an iconoclastic 
letter by Johnston. In short, Johnston felt that the recital of the Rosary at republican 
commemorations was sectarian in affiliating republicanism with one particular religious 
denomination.156 MacStíofáin instead read this to be anti-religious Marxism and refused to 
distribute the paper in his local command area. Significantly, MacStíofáin knew he would be 
reprimanded but not too severely. In fact, he was confident that he would be re-elected at that 
year’s Convention and he was proven correct.157 MacStíofáin had seemingly jeopardised his 
place on the pitch only to strengthen his support base. ‘Professional fouls’ were worth the risk 
if they gained attention and plaudits.158 
By 1967 no significant shift in control had been achieved by either side. In an August 1967 
meeting, Goulding asserted to those present that there ‘must be an end to indecision to doubts, 
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to questioning… We are not playing around for amusement’s sake. We are not immortal and 
what is to be done must be done now…’.159 With no authoritative room for manoeuvre 
frustrations had peaked. No progress had been made in any direction because no course of 
action could be decided upon. Despite the heightened tensions, new competitive moves, that 
were less personalized, came to be strategized.  
 
Figure 3: The haunted Leinster House. United Irishman, March 1965. 
II 
Structural Changes 
The competitive breakthrough came in the Conventions of 1968. Conventions offered a distinct 
arena in which republicans could devise and implement political strategy. Motions and 
amendments were formulated beforehand or on the spot, and their specific wording and timing 
mattered to their success. All motions and amendments needed to be seconded before they 
were discussed, so an ally had to be consulted beforehand. For an impromptu motion to be 
seconded a gesture to an associate was sometimes required, such as a gentle kick.160 A chairman 
was appointed to make sure procedure was followed. In fact, this appointment itself often 
became a tactical gambit; Ó Brádaigh came to realise that Goulding and Mac Giolla, now siding 
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increasingly with the Marxists, kept asking him to oversee procedure so as to isolate him.161 
Informal ‘whips’ were also active; Costello was on one occasion caught handing out edited voting 
instructions.162 Even tea breaks could become tactical intermissions.163 Attendance fluctuated 
according to location, extra-parliamentary activity, and changing levels of success. Once in the 
political arena attendees were continually calculating the odds; as recorded by Johnston, one 
could grasp the ‘political flavour’ of a convention by those in attendance, the comments raised, 
and the success of certain motions.164 It was through this competitive medium that the Marxist 
republicans managed to finally take the lead.  
In changing the debate to questions concerning organisational structure the Marxists managed 
to out-manoeuvre their opponents. Up until 1968 the debate at these conventions had been 
dominated by motions regarding major policy changes.165 If the dispute was to progress a more 
subtle approach was needed. The Army Convention preceded the Ard Fheis. This order mattered 
as IRA decisions took precedence; a motion passed by the IRA was likely to be replicated by Sinn 
Fein. At the Army Convention, a motion was forwarded to increase the size of the Army Council. 
On the surface, it was presented as a means of improving representation by giving regional 
leaders a chance to better influence decision making. MacStíofáin and Ó Brádaigh were 
immediately alert to the possibility that it was a ploy.166 But counterarguments concerning 
logistics and security were unlikely to defeat a motion premised upon democratisation.  
The actual political product, branded as democratic, had been carefully calculated with regard 
to size and electoral procedure. The council would be enlarged from seven to twenty. A new 
electoral scheme would see seven members elected by the Executive, as usual, while eight 
others would be elected at regional meetings, and a further five co-opted by the fifteen.167 The 
Marxist republicans had a guaranteed majority as Goulding, as C/S, had a say over the 
appointment of local leaders who would be leading the regional meetings and elections. 
Because the electoral process was staggered a majority at the fifteen-member mark would 
consequently secure for them a majority of the co-opted nominees. In the end, there was a 
majority of 12-8 in favour of the Marxists, with notable figures such as Johnston, Malachy 
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McGurran, and Belfast O/C Billy McMillen being elected.168 MacStíofáin was to concede that it 
was a clever move, ‘the odds were now vastly increased against those of us who upheld militant 
republican separatism… That resolution cleverly outwitted the majority of the delegates…’.169 
Ultimately, with all the old seats of authority occupied and proving too difficult to open up, new 
positions of influence had to be made.  
The Marxist republicans capitalised on their newly won advantage in the subsequent Ard Fheis. 
Discussion was dominated by a series of structural motions and amendments. Garland proposed 
that the Ard Chomhairle be expanded from fifteen to twenty-five persons. Thirteen including 
the president were to be elected by the Ard Fheis and the other twelve regionally. This 
succeeded by 48 votes to 37.170 It is noticeable that in emphasising the need for regional 
representation the IRA’s new democratic structure was to mirror the provincial Ireland 
envisaged by positive independents such as the Ó Brádaigh brothers. Any counterargument on 
democratic grounds was, therefore, difficult to mount.  
With the structural changes secured, the Marxist republicans then returned to a discussion of 
policy. Garland rose to amend the planned anti-abstentionist resolution by calling for a 
commission to assess the new situation in Ireland. In seconding the motion, Costello made a 
vehemently anti-abstentionist speech.171 The subtlety of the move planned by Garland was 
nearly lost as a result of Costello’s increasing impatience. Goulding and Garland later admitted 
finding Costello difficult to work with as his arrogance and abrasiveness often hindered 
progress.172 Recovery speeches, however, managed to re-brand the commission as open-ended 
and not a vote for anti-abstentionism.173 With the motion eventually passing, the stage was set 
for a change of direction the following year.   
III 
Maximising and Salvaging Control 
The shift in control was to mark another phase in the competition. With the Marxist republicans 
in a majority on the Army Council, the all-important leadership stamp of approval for 
constitutional changes had been secured. In acknowledgement of this, the moves planned by 
independence-focused republicans became far more daring. It was only in this context of 
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centralisation that splintering became a serious strategic option. However, the preferentiality of 
splintering was not uniform. Key republican players such as Ó Brádaigh and MacStíofáin would 
continue to compete within the IRA right up until the defining extraordinary Army Convention 
of December 1969.  
During this period, peripheral republican players concerned by the changing direction of the IRA 
came out in public against the GHQ line. Republican commemorations were strictly controlled 
by the leadership as such occasions presented them with the opportunity to communicate the 
way ahead.174 However, this trend of commemorative leadership domination was to be 
disrupted in 1968-9 by members of the Cumann na mBan and veteran Belfast republicans. Public 
criticism was not tolerated, and those violating the rules understood that dismissals were likely 
to follow.175 With that in mind, these competitive acts were only made if no other option 
appeared possible or effective in influencing developments. Lower-ranked members with little 
institutional authority were, thus, more likely to make such a stand. As stressed above, playing 
by the rules was vital if leaders were to retain their positions of influence.176  
The first act of defiance took place at the Bodenstown commemoration of 1968 by a substantial 
section of the Cumann na mBan. Infuriated upon seeing the Connolly Youth Movement’s flag 
they refused to march claiming that it was communistic. Goulding, aware of their vocal 
criticisms, had already approached them, and told the dissident women they were not needed. 
Following this confrontation, the Army Council in autumn 1968 allowed women to join the IRA. 
Before the 1969 Bodenstown oration, Cumann na mBan, now separated from the IRA, released 
a public statement refusing to attend and lambasted the political direction being taken. Despite 
this press release, it is recorded that they did attend and handed out critical leaflets containing 
the ‘Ten Commandments’ from the re-examination of 1965.177 In his research on republican 
women, Reinisch has challenged the general perception that republican women were passive. 
He argues that they did have agency and were active participants. Reinisch goes too far, 
however, in arguing that the Cumann na mBan dissidents were the ‘first Provisionals’, claiming 
that their open confrontation ‘planted the seeds of the future split’.178 This presents splits as 
symbolic acts of open defiance. Instead we need to view these acts in principally political terms.  
 
174 Bodenstown orations were dominated by Marxist republicans. United Irishman, July 1966; United 
Irishman, July 1967; United Irishman, July 1968. 
175 Taylor, Provos, 46. 
176 Also see Moloney, Voices from the Grave, 204.  
177 Reinisch, ‘Women’s Agency’, 425-30. 
178 Ibid. 436.  
 36 
 
Republican women were most certainly engaged in the political dispute. As one interviewee told 
Reinisch, ‘we were unhappy with the political directions and so we said, as long as (the 
republican movement) is not back on the (correct) path, we have nothing to do with them.’179 
The women were clearly concerned with the direction being taken by the IRA leadership. 
However, as this comment reveals their ability to influence the direction was restricted. The 
competitive options available to them were limited as a result of their institutional 
subordination. They were not IRA members, they could not attend Army Conventions, and they 
could not compete for seats of authority. The only means available to them were public acts 
that condemned the approach being taken. Public stunts while they often succeeded in being 
disruptive exposed the actors to reprimand. Cumann na mBan were consequently prohibited 
from using IRA and Sinn Fein premises, and propagandised as having been disbanded.180 
Moreover, as Reinisch notes, republican women were ‘used’ by the competing factions.181 
Goulding soon after the first Cumann na mBan confrontation allowed women to join the IRA in 
the knowledge that those joining would support him. Women did have agency, but it was 
restricted by the cultural mould of patriarchal militarism.  
The second act of disobedience was to take place in July 1969. Thousands of republicans 
assembled in Mullingar for the reinternment of two IRA volunteers, James McCormick and Peter 
Barnes, executed on 7 February 1940 by the British state. Veteran Belfast republican, Jimmy 
Steele, used his oration that day to verbally attack the leadership who were metres away from 
him. He denounced the current direction as being ‘more conversant with the teaching of 
Chairman Mao than those of our dead patriots’.182 Dunne, a member of the Dublin firing party 
that day, was so enraged by the speech that he contemplated shooting Steele.183 Violent 
thoughts, however, did not materialise into violent acts. Violence was simply not necessary, 
other methods were readily available.184 Two weeks later Belfast adjutant Jim Sullivan made a 
random visit to Steele’s house and dismissed him under GHQ instruction for openly going against 
IRA policy. While the house visit was intended to be intrusive, an implicit ‘we know where you 
live’, it was not violent.185  
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The speech had, however, not been solely produced by Steele, other Belfast republicans of a 
similar generational background, such as Billy McKee and Cahill, had helped him to write it.186 
Many of these veteran Belfast republicans had resigned or been dismissed in the 1960s but were 
becoming increasingly energised by the changing political context in Northern Ireland. This 
offered Southern-based republicans, such as MacStíofáin, potential republican allies. 
MacStíofáin’s verdict on Steele’s speech was twofold, while he agreed with the political 
sentiments raised, he disagreed with the nature of the political act, he felt Steele should have 
kept quiet.187 His dismissal was to further limit their capacity to compete internally.  
The disorder and violence that unfolded in Belfast and Derry in August 1969, leading to the 
deployment of the British Army, offered an opportunity to those seeking an armed 
independence struggle. The argument made by the PIRA that the militarily moribund old-IRA ran 
away instead of providing defence has been countered by the research of Hanley and Warner; 
units had been deployed by McMillen and Sullivan. Warner has argued that, ‘what the violence 
of 13-15 August did was provide a chance to breakaway…’.188 The utility of the events is 
emphasised in an account given by PIRA volunteer Brendan Hughes, ‘McKee always said, “This 
was our opportunity, the Brits are here…”’.189 Warner’s argument importantly moves away from 
the view that the PIRA were formed out of a gut reaction to loyalist violence. The veteran Belfast 
republicans were most certainly energised by the events, but the nature of their consequent 
actions was strategic. In fact, their first course of action was to devise a coup. Once again, the 
preference was to always compete internally.  
Reconstructing the variant plans and their preferentiality is no easy task.190 Nevertheless, the 
available evidence shows that splintering was a choice amongst others, and the timings suggest 
that splintering was a plan B implemented after other strategies failed. Plans were devised at a 
secret meeting in Belfast on 24 August. Those present were Jimmy Steele, McKee, Cahill, John 
and Billy Kelly, Leo Martin, Twomey, Jimmy Drumm, the young Adams, and the Southerner 
O’Connell.191 Those assembled were united in their dissatisfaction at the demilitarised state of 
the IRA. John Kelly, in a later interview, told journalist Peter Taylor that they had planned a 
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coup.192 The actual makeup of this meeting is itself revealing. O’Connell a close friend and ally 
of Ó Brádaigh was Donegal O/C.193 O’Connell was, therefore, a link between this Belfast faction 
and those independence-focused republicans in the South. In addition to this, MacStíofáin had 
established strong contacts with disgruntled Belfast republicans in his role as IRA intelligence 
officer.194 This channel of communication appears to have allowed the Belfast republicans to 
devise a thorough plan of action.  
On 22 September, a contingent led McKee stormed into a Belfast brigade meeting. In carrying 
weapons, they transformed themselves into gunman. This was done so as to redress the power 
balance and give Belfast leaders McMillen and Sullivan an offer they could not refuse. The four 
conditions agreed upon after a tense discussion are said to be as follows: six veteran Belfast 
republicans were incorporated into the Belfast IRA staff; four members of the national 
leadership, including Goulding, were to be removed; a separate Northern Command was to be 
set up; and Belfast delegates were, apparently, ordered not to attend the special Army 
Convention arranged for mid-December in a move to suspend communications with Dublin. The 
Convention was clearly on their mind, however, as a three-month deadline was given.195 Taylor 
has commented that ‘Given the subsequent internecine history of IRA feuds, it was a miracle 
that there was no bloodshed.’196 This is unconvincing, in trying to stage a re-entrance the actual 
use of violence would have been counterproductive; force was limited so as to ease re-entry. In 
this context, violence was always the last option.  
Each demand needs to be examined closely if we are to best understand their intentions. The 
first, concerning the expansion of the Belfast brigade staff, was a means of re-entrance that 
allowed them to obtain local positions of influence. The second condition was of greater 
significance. The Marxist majority within the Army Council was four members strong. If four key 
leaders were removed it would reverse the discrepancy in power on the Council. A purge of 
Marxists was not envisaged; their plan was far more intricate. The four leaders supposedly 
targeted for removal were Goulding, Ryan, Costello, and Johnston. One account goes further in 
asserting that they posited Garland as a replacement C/S. Swan has stated that this suggests the 
Belfast republicans lacked relevant information.197 This is unconvincing, Southern-based 
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republicans, as shown above, were in direct contact with them and could have easily conveyed 
such information.  
Their best chance of success was to base their selection on those directly connected to August 
1969, that being Garland and Ryan who dealt with Belfast officers seeking weapons, and weaker 
targets, such as Costello and Johnston, who were disliked by many.198 Furthermore, Ryan has 
revealed that MacStíofáin visited his house in July and said that he admired both him and 
Garland.199 Fracture lines within the opponent team were identified and exploited. Garland was 
absent for much of the year in Glasgow distancing him from events.200 Whether Garland was in 
fact aired as a replacement is unverifiable, the important point here is that a wholesale change 
in personnel would have stood little chance of success, the isolation of a few influential persons 
was far more realistic. The third demand, the establishment of a Northern Command, would 
have allowed for a degree of regional autonomy weakening the Marxists degree of control. At 
this stage of the analysis, it is apparent that this was a most complicated strategy aimed at an 
internal redistribution of power. 
The fourth clause, regarding attendance at the Army Convention, further complicates matters.  
MacStíofáin and Ó Brádaigh apparently tried to persuade the discontented Belfast republicans 
to attend.201 Their objective was to make August ‘69 a topic for discussion at the expense of the 
major policy motions. A first-hand account from a Belfast republican would have increased its 
resonance. However, there was a problem, the delegation from Belfast would surely have been 
led by the O/C McMillen, a Goulding supporter on the Army Council, and possibly another 
person accepted by him. The incorporation of dissidents onto the Belfast brigade staff may well 
have sought to address this obvious problem.  
More recently, a new piece of evidence has come to light. An internal memo dated 18 October, 
for Marxist republican eyes only, addressed the issue of the ‘core of the “non-political” wing of 
the Belfast movement’ who having stood aside during the agitational build up were said to ‘not 
understand it’. It forcefully stated they had ‘no right to influence decisions that are made from 
here out’. Most surprisingly, it listed a set of terms that Belfast would have to agree to: an 
immediate resumption of United Irishman sales and an acceptance ‘that there would be no 
representation at the Convention for anybody who had publicly attacked the movement or for 
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any unit with such people in a position of influence.’202 Steele’s Mullingar oration had proved 
very costly indeed, for it gave the Marxist republicans the grounds to prevent him and his allies 
attending the all crucial December Convention. Cahill and McKee have stated that their intention 
was to severe ties with Dublin and form a separate ‘Northern IRA’.203 In other words, a 
breakaway was their preferential choice. But one piece of evidence refutes this, a separate 
‘Northern IRA’ was never formed. In fact, these Belfast republicans waited patiently until the 
Convention was completed before they set up an alternative organisation with leading 
dissidents from the South. The September 22 demands crucially kept their organisational 
position ambivalent. By late October, their possible role in the internal competition had been 
effectively blocked by the Marxists on the grounds of their public attack. At that point, with the 
odds of a coup succeeding low and the Convention unlikely to block the new proposals, plan B 
came to the fore.  
South of the border, MacStíofáin and Ó Brádaigh were still manoeuvring internally while 
acknowledging the prospect of a schism. Ó Brádaigh recalls that during these final months he 
was ‘maximizing’ his position.204 The Garland commission had produced a document, entitled 
Ireland Today, proposing two key policy changes: a National Liberation Front (NLF) of leftist 
groups and the abandonment of abstentionism.205 These were subsequently recommended by 
both leadership Councils.206 The ‘general feeling’ from preliminary local brigade meetings was 
that the authority of ‘the Republic should remain with the Army Council…’.207 With the Marxist 
republicans having seemingly secured victory, MacStíofáin presented them with a compromise 
deal. He proposed that the motions only be debated at the Ard Fheis leaving the IRA to military 
matters. This was rejected as unacceptable. The Marxists were not prepared to give up control 
of the parent organisation.208 
Despite these setbacks, internal competitive moves would continue up to the finishing line. Ó 
Brádaigh remembers signing a document drafted by Goulding for Irish American supporters. 
While he disagreed with its contents, he predicted that a failure to sign it would have resulted 
in his dismissal.209 Others were less cautious, O’Connell walked out of a Donegal IRA meeting 
and was subsequently suspended for transgression. Ó Brádaigh felt that O’Connell had made a 
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mistake, as his republican profile and rhetorical skill would be missed at the upcoming 
Convention.210  
When the Convention finally took place on 13 December, MacStíofáin still tried to influence 
proceedings.211 He proposed that the policy motions be re-ordered in order to prevent a long 
leftist debate on the NLF motion affecting the mindset of delegates.212 The independence-
focused republicans also accused the Marxists of deliberately providing selective transportation. 
Mulcahy, from Limerick, and a few others were missing that day.213 In the end, a large majority, 
28-12, voted for the anti-abstentionist motion. The minority twelve sat together in the hall, 
undertook tactical discussions at breaks, and refused to participate in the leadership 
elections.214 Ryan feared that MacStíofáin would draw a gun at the Convention and had a 
number of volunteers armed as a precaution.215 However, the suspected coup did not arise, and 
the meeting broke up in an amicable fashion. Goulding approached MacStíofáin and said, ‘I hope 
you’ll have a talk with me before you do anything’.216 Goulding may have maximised control 
over the ‘Official’ IRA, but, as this final comment suggests, he lacked control over the breakaway 
element. After the Convention, O’Connell rang Ó Brádaigh for an update, Ó Brádaigh responded, 
‘The minority is going to expel the majority.’217 The competition had not finished it was merely 
changing form. MacStíofáin the next day held a meeting with the veteran Belfast republicans to 
relay the result and confirm the schismatic plan of action. On 18 December, a ‘Provisional’ 
Convention brought about the formation of the PIRA.218  
In sum, the split was the culmination of an internal competitive game in which one team 
managed to obtain the means of control so as to allow them to determine the direction of the 
IRA. The methods of obtaining and maintaining authority in this ordered institutional setting 
were notably peaceful; violence was contemplated but rarely used. The page can be turned in 
the knowledge that alongside reading guerrilla and socialist texts Goulding had consulted 
Niccolò Machiavelli’s political manual, The Prince, to help him maintenaro la stato (maintain his 
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standing).219 Guidance on winning both external and internal political conflicts was needed to 
succeed.  
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Chapter 3: Inter-organisational Competition between the OIRA and PIRA, 1970-72  
I 
The Expected Walkout?  
With two rival IRAs now in existence, the matter of who was to control Sinn Fein remained 
unsettled. The Ard Fheis planned for 10-11 January 1970 was given upmost importance. In the 
month-long interval between the Army Convention and Ard Fheis, the inter-organisational 
competition had begun at a vigorous pace. A republican publication recalled that ‘the scramble 
for delegates was only equalled by the scramble for (arms) dumps.’220 Each organisation was 
seeking to promote itself above the other.  
The newly deployed British Army was keen to keep track of this republican competition. A 
meeting of OIRA leaders from across the six-counties had, according to British intelligence, taken 
place on 7 January in order to setup a ‘Northern Command’. The impetus was a competitive one, 
it was hoped that its creation would counteract criticisms claiming that they were unable to 
offer armed protection to the Catholic areas of Belfast.221 This initiative, as intended, would have 
been fresh in the minds of Sinn Fein delegates. 
Most anticipated that the Ard Fheis would endorse the new policy motions. Delegates aligned 
to the PIRA had planned a walkout upon the approval of the anti-abstentionist motion. Their 
objective in mustering supporters was to establish themselves as a large minority and make a 
show of strength in front of the press, which was to be stationed outside the prospective venue, 
the Dublin Intercontinental Hotel. The plan then envisaged delegates congregating at a separate 
hall to form a rival Sinn Fein subordinate to the PIRA. With this in mind, Ruan O’Donnell has 
claimed that the walkout that occurred at the Ard Fheis was ‘all but inevitable’.222 This view 
overlooks the important point that the actual walkout enacted was not the one planned; the 
anti-abstentionist motion did not pass. Republican predictions were proven wrong, what 
appeared to be a certainty did not materialise. The walkout, therefore, needs to be revisited.  
The walkout was in fact triggered by an ad hoc political manoeuvre devised by impatient Marxist 
republicans. The attendance recorded for 11 January session was 257 delegates.223 This near 
three-fold increase in attendance from the last Ard Fheis was a result of the extra-parliamentary 
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activities undertaken by the rivalrous republican organisations.224 After a four-hour long debate, 
the motion was taken and failed to secure the required two-thirds majority; although 153 
delegates had voted in favour. Following this an impromptu proposal called for a vote of 
confidence in the OIRA leadership. With this motion requiring a simple majority, MacStíofáin 
rose to declare his allegiance to the PIRA Army Council and a walkout was staged of some 60-
100 persons.225 The opinion held by Séamus Ó Tuathail, editor of United Irishman, was that ‘it 
was a principle not to splinter the Republican Movement on the issue of a tactic’.226 In his view, 
a walkout could, and should, have been avoided.  
Those Marxist republicans who favoured a complete break were concerned that Sinn Fein would 
become an anchor infringing the progress of the OIRA. Máirín de Burca published an article in 
1986, with the aim of dispelling the ‘misconception that the people who left the IRA and Sinn 
Fein… did so because the abstentionist policy had been abandoned.’ She emphasised that what 
people often forgot was that the Ard Fheis defeated that very policy.227 This presented the 
independence-focused republicans with the opportunity to block the electoral strategy of the 
Marxist republicans. In defeating the proposal, they retained a degree of negative control not 
only over Sinn Fein but the OIRA. De Burca recalled that to ‘everyone’s astonishment the vote 
fell just short… the hall erupted into shouting and cheering and stamping of feet.’ The anti-
abstentionist group, to which she was a part of, feared that this had ‘starved off the walk-out’ 
planned by their rivals. Dennis Cassin, an Armagh delegate, and close associate of Costello, then 
waited for a lull between resolutions, took hold of the microphone, and in a ‘thunderous voice’ 
proposed a vote of allegiance to the Official Army Council. The motion had been deliberately 
manufactured to trigger a walkout by the Provisionals, as de Burca recalled, so that ‘Each group 
was free to pursue its own politics without having to placate a dissident rump.’228  Full control 
could only be secured following a complete severance.229  
The Marxist republicans needed Sinn Fein more than the Provisionals. MacStíofáin’s proposed 
compromise deal, mentioned in the last chapter, had crucially focused on control of the IRA. An 
opportunity to severely disrupt the Marxist republicans’ agitational plans, without hindering the 
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PIRA’s militaristic agenda, had presented itself. In realisation of this, Cassin moved to cut loose 
those who could further prevent the OIRA’s change in direction.  
II 
Framing the Split 
With the split complete, competing republican narratives were propagandised. Each republican 
organisation sought to define events according to their particular interpretative scheme. As 
Prince and Warner have stated, ‘The struggle to shape how an event is described and 
interpreted- to control the narrative- is an integral part of the event itself.’230 This analysis stems 
from Paul Brass’s research on Hindu-Muslim riots that disaggregates political acts into three 
interlinked phases: preparation, enactment, and interpretation.231 The 1969 IRA split was 
planned, enacted, and its meaning contested.  
The OIRA presented the split as a Fianna Fail232 plot. Multiple press releases were made by the 
Officials in an attempt to assert their story.233 Leading Belfast OIRA member McMillen, in his 
1973 Bodenstown oration, weaved the split into a narrative of imperialistic manipulation. He 
stated that the imperialist forces had needed ‘a new Catholic sectarian force’ to retain their hold 
over Ireland. The August ‘pogroms’ had been instigated by the forces of sectarianism who 
manufactured, and fed off, communal divisions. The Dublin government then played ‘their part 
in the imperialist plot’ by fuelling the sectarianism with money and  guns. He concluded by 
saying: 
‘Thus the Provisionals were born, and the mindless violence and senseless 
sectarianism which followed their birth fitted perfectly into the plans of the 
imperialists.’234  
This OIRA narrative depicted the split as having been manufactured by the forces of imperialism, 
making its offspring, the Provisionals, an imperialist tool used to exacerbate sectarianism at the 
expense of unification, namely class unity.235 To the contrary, Matt Treacy’s research has 
compellingly shown that the Dublin government did not feel threatened by some ‘mythical 
leftist threat’.236 Following the violence of 13-15 August, three Fianna Fail ministers had been 
given the task of dealing with the North in possession of a sizeable Grant-in-Aid fund. These 
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ministers, along with an Irish Army intelligence officer, contacted IRA members, including 
Goulding and Ryan, offering money to help defend the North. The narrative constructed by the 
Officials asserts that the money was selectively given to dissidents as part of an attempt to split 
the IRA. To the contrary, Treacy has highlighted that money was offered and transferred to 
Goulding and OIRA members in the North.237 External interference by outside forces was always 
a possible factor in internal developments. However, the lack of selectivity and incentive here 
suggests that Fianna Fail’s involvement was spun by the Officials in order to undermine the PIRA. 
In fact, the Marxist republicans, believing a split to be likely, had, in autumn 1969, begun 
preparing their narrative. Articles in United Irishman were published warning readers to beware 
of Fianna Fail’s ‘tainted gold’ and an Evening Standard article referred to Fianna Fail 
intervention.238  
The PIRA’s narrative mirrored the Official’s in that it placed emphasis on the influence of external 
forces in causing the split. Ó Brádaigh, in a 1970 interview, claimed that the Goulding leadership 
were ‘taking directions from the outside’.239 In its first edition, An Phoblacht stressed that the 
split had been caused by ‘An Attempt to Take Over the Republican Movement’.240 This theme of 
outside ‘masterminding’ was reinforced in a most vehement article, in the Republican News, 
which declared that ‘Gradually into executive positions both in the IRA and Sinn Fein the Red 
agents infiltrated… Young men and girls were brainwashed…’.241 The split, according to the PIRA, 
was an act of purification in which the IRA was salvaged from an alien communistic element 
masquerading itself as republican.  
These narratives had important consequences, especially in securing Irish American support. 
Most Irish American republicans were staunchly anti-communist and anti-Free State. The 
competing republican interpretations of the split were, therefore, partly aimed at winning Irish 
American funds and weapons. It was recorded by British intelligence, in May 1970, that the Irish 
organisations in America, except for one, were financially supporting the PIRA. It explained that 
the Officials were finding it difficult to raise funds because of their communist affiliations.242 In 
fact, Goulding had tried to curtail this possibility by making a trip to America in December 1969 
where he declared, at a Convention of the Clan na Gael, that Fianna Fail had seduced members 
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of the IRA. Through narration the rival IRAs were competing to win the allegiance of their Irish 
American counterparts who, distanced by the Atlantic, were reliant on such stories to determine 
their allegiances.243 
A ‘heliocentric’ pattern is evident in these republican narratives. Moments of open divergence 
that run contrary to their proclamation of national unity are accounted for by recourse to some 
conspirator. There is a parallel here to the accounts collected by Ted Swedenburg in his study of 
the Palestinian thawra (revolt) of 1936-9. His interviewees repeatedly referred to intrigues 
against the Palestinians as a means of explaining their failure to fulfil their national objective.244 
Patrick Wright coined this type of historical thinking ‘heliocentric’; it is a ‘history which cuts in 
from above’.245 This heliocentrism is a reflection of their belief in imperialism, when events do 
not correspond with nationalist logic some external, often hidden, actor is mentioned as denying 
them their righteous future.  
III 
Fragmentation and Decentralisation 
In an August 1974 interview, Goulding gave an assessment of the 1969 split, ‘We had the 
Provisional split. But for two or three years before that we had the foot-dragging’, he went on 
to say that the split ‘was a positive help in that it helped clear the deck of all the flotsam and 
jetsam that was in our way.’ Within the space of a few sentences, Goulding came to contradict 
this positive appraisal remarking that, ‘they finally broke away and started the physical-force 
campaign, and they constituted another obstacle.’246 These comments are vital to 
understanding the significance of fragmentation.247 The maximal level of control, as 
demonstrated by Goulding’s comment, could only be achieved by no split taking place. 
Controlling and limiting the actions of organisational rivals was a difficult task. Theoretically, 
fragmentation could have been avoided. Two possible scenarios come to mind: the losers 
remaining within the confines of the original organisation, subordinate to the winners; or 
alternatively, the dismissal of the losers without a splinter group being formed.248 In late 1969, 
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of course, the losing faction undermined this ideal situation for the Marxist republicans by 
creating a rival organisation. In doing this, the competition was extended and qualitatively 
transformed.   
The form of the 1969 split mattered greatly in the extent to which it fragmented republican 
politics.  Previous splinter groups had failed because they relied on a localised support base and 
struggled to be heard above the IRA. The Irish Revolutionary Force, that had emerged in the 
early 1960s, was geographically circumscribed to Cork and failed to effectively extend its 
authoritative reach beyond that area. Saor Uladh, formed in the early 1950s, after the expulsion 
of prominent east Tyrone republican Liam Kelly, epitomised this localised trend. This 
organisation had a distinctive Northern complexion with most of the East Tyrone and South 
Derry IRA units following Kelly. By 1959, it had run out of fuel having been largely reliant on the 
local popularity of Kelly who emigrated to America.249 Interorganisational competition was, 
therefore, always a risky choice. The ‘Official’ IRA had a national framework in place and a 
symbolic gravitational pull difficult to rival. The PIRA, in contrast to the splinter groups outlined 
above, was from its infancy a cross-border organisation. This best explains the patience shown 
by veteran Belfast republicans in the autumn of 1969. Had the Belfast faction broken away by 
itself the chances of it succeeding would have been minimal. Gearóid Ó Faoleán has emphasised 
that without the material and logistical support of republicans in the South, the PIRA would have 
been unable to sustain its campaign for more than a year.250 The Northerners were reliant on 
the training camps, safe houses, bomb factories, and weapons the Southern republicans had to 
offer. Conversely, those Southern-based republicans, whose principal support base was in the 
rural Western counties, such as Ó Brádaigh, needed allies living in the destabilised urban areas 
of the North from which a new campaign could be launched. Thus, in order to best compete 
inter-organisationally they formed a coalition. 
Republican fragmentation converged with the decentralisation of regional and central 
governance in Northern Ireland. The civil rights movement had called into question the 
democratic legitimacy of the Stormont regime. Beginning in late 1968, civil rights protestors took 
to the streets demanding that the political system be reformed. The demands made concerned 
gerrymandering, one man one vote, the Specials Powers Act, and the unfair allocation of housing 
and jobs. Protestors argued that provincial and local governance often ruled in favour of a 
particular section of the populace, namely the Protestant community. Fuelled by this sense of 
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political injustice demonstrations were held bringing the protestors, sometimes deliberately, 
into conflict with the local security forces, and as pictures of bloodied protestors emerged the 
RUC and the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC) increasingly became another source of grievance.  
During this period, the British cabinet were tentative and viewed the protests in social rather 
than political terms. This stemmed from the appraisal given by Northern Ireland Prime Minister 
Terence O’Neill, who believed that housing and unemployment were the central issues at play. 
Reforms proposed by him, therefore, fell short of addressing the issue of political equality. Some 
form of inclusive settlement which incorporated Catholics into the administration was required. 
In opposition to this, unionist organisations were mobilising people against the call for civil rights 
in the belief that it was a subversive IRA ploy and that the Stormont parliament was a 
democratically elected institution. With the proliferation of rival organisations, decentralisation 
occurred. It must be stressed that this was not a straightforward linear process; the appeal and 
authority of these rival organisations would oscillate overtime. In this decentralised context, the 
formulation and implementation of a reform programme was relegated below the task of 
restoring law and order.251 
During late 1969 and early 1970, defence committees and associations became key actors. 
Behind the barricades in west Belfast, designated the ‘No Go Land’, Sullivan, adjutant of the 
OIRA in Belfast, acted as Chairman of the Central Citizens Defence Committee (CCDC). The role 
played by Sullivan during this early period provides a crucial insight into the OIRA’s strategic 
approach and how it was to be ‘spoiled’ by the PIRA’s strategy of provocation. On 27 August 
1969, the First and Second in Command of the Royal Hampshire Regiment attended an 
emergency meeting of the CCDC. The meeting was held in Leeson Street, in the Lower Falls road 
area, and Sullivan acted as the spokesperson for a group comprising representatives from across 
the Catholic areas of Belfast, including MPs Paddy Devlin and Patrick Kennedy. The committee 
were anxious about having not yet received a response to their conditions for a ‘return to 
normality’. These conditions were as follows: the disbandment and disarming of the RUC and 
USC who were to be replaced by an impartial police force; the release of those who had recently 
been arrested; implementation of a ‘Covenant of Civil Rights’; and, finally, the call in of all 
personal weapons including shot guns. Sullivan’s control over this committee was limited; the 
CCDC was a conglomerate of political activists and residents who all demanded input.252 
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The extent of Sullivan’s involvement in this committee and his cooperation with the British Army 
is striking. Despite the above demands not outrightly being agreed to, he appears to have 
remained hopeful that far-reaching reforms were possible. With this in mind, he was continually 
negotiating the dismantling of barricades and the re-entrance of the security forces. On 15 
October, it was agreed by the Central Defence Committee (CDC) of the Falls Road that the RUC 
could be gradually re-introduced into the area.253 Following this re-introduction trouble 
occurred and Sullivan complained to the British that a particular Constable, named Green, would 
not be well received if he was allowed to patrol again.254 The message was relayed to the RUC 
and Green was no longer permitted to patrol that area.255 Keeping good relations with the locals 
was clearly a priority.256  
However, Sullivan’s cooperative stance was not favoured by all.257 British intelligence in late 
1969, received a report, from a ‘reliable source’, that an ‘extreme republican element’ in the 
Falls road were criticising Sullivan for encouraging the people to co-operate with the British 
Army. It was their view that the British Army should not be welcomed, and militant action taken 
against soldiers. In contrast, Sullivan and his republican supporters argued that the immediate 
aim was to first secure reforms. Once that was achieved, it would be a case of the ‘People v. the 
British Army’ and an IRA military campaign would stand a greater chance of success against an 
‘Army of Occupation’.258 The OIRA strategy, therefore, depended on an avoidance of violence in 
the immediate term so as to allow for the implementation of reforms.  
By January 1970, security force patrols into the ‘No Go Land’ had become the major source of 
grievance. On 15 January, a military vehicle responding to the report of an alarm at 31 Balkan 
Street was confronted by a crowd of some 200 persons. It was felt by members of the crowd 
that this was an attempt by the RUC and Army to patrol the area ad lib. British Army personnel 
recorded that the ‘saving grace’ was Sullivan who upon his arrival calmed the crowd and 
persuaded them to let the vehicle pass through.259 Sullivan had, in fact, returned a favour, in the 
previous week he had expressed his gratitude to the security forces for allowing him to deal with 
two cases of domestic strife without the involvement of the police.260 A symbiotic relationship 
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between the British Army leadership and Sullivan had developed. Not only did Sullivan react to 
mitigate cases of confrontation but he also proactively worked to prevent them occurring. In a 
phone conversation with a British Brigade Commander, Sullivan said he suspected that bogus 
999 calls were being made to get the police into the area and worsen relations. He promised 
that he would do all he could to prevent this happening.261 Conflicts are complicated; a leading 
Belfast republican was actively cooperating with the British to defuse the situation so that 
reforms stood a chance of being discussed and implemented.  
At the same time, unionist organisations in the Shankill were attempting to mobilise people in 
opposition to the security forces. On 20 January 1970, it was recorded that plans were being 
prepared by the Shankill Defence Association (SDA) to forcibly remove the RUC from the Shankill 
area. Reports indicated that the SDA hoped to hold a meeting at Argyle Primary School to 
formulate a plan of action.262 Having placed watchers in Leeson street, loyalists concluded that 
the RUC were not patrolling key areas of the Falls and that the Protestant community were being 
‘hood-winked’.263 However, the SDA were not the only organisation seeking to assert itself. 
Residents from the Shankill in late January formed a 12-person representative committee, 
headed by MP John McQuade, with the aim of communicating their grievances to the military 
hierarchy. According to a local, trouble was likely to occur over any minor incident.264 On 24 
January, police were prevented from carrying out an arrest in the area after a crowd of 30-40 
persons intervened, exclaiming that if the RUC were unable to make arrests in the Falls then 
neither could they in the Shankill.265 In an attempt to defuse the situation, Shankill residents 
were given the opportunity to raise their grievances to security force personnel on 25 January. 
The main points raised concerned negotiations with Jim Sullivan. They urged the security forces 
to get behind the barricades otherwise the IRA would be allowed to build up their weapons 
stocks.266  
The SDA, having refused to participate in discussions, enacted their expected confrontation with 
the military the next day. Charles Coggle, brother in law of the SDA Chairman, was identified as 
having masterminded the demonstration. A crowd had been formed by Coggle and in moving 
toward Unity Flats it was blocked by the First Parachute Regiment. In pinpointing Coggle, the 
British Commanding Officer (C/O) convinced him to ring his ‘masters’ and arrange a meeting 
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between himself and them. Following a positive response, Coggle then helped to dissipate the 
crowd. It was suspected by the British C/O that the SDA had hoped to use force against them 
that night. This suspicion was strengthened when it was later learnt that several persons in the 
crowd had been carrying weapons. The SDA had seemingly hoped to contest the authoritative 
remit of the security forces through provocation and then ‘retaliatory’ violence. This strategy of 
provocation appears to have also been adopted as a result of competition with the newly formed 
committee. As the British C/O noted, while the crowd was behind the SDA that night, it did not 
represent the majority of those living in the Shankill.267 This was instead an organisation seeking 
to bolster its legitimacy. 
It must be emphasised that these organisations did not embody the communities they claimed 
to represent. In fact, they often used violence against members of their own community to 
enforce their authority. On 28 October 1969, a shooting incident occurred outside MacKey’s 
factory on the Springfield Road, categorised, in the British military records, as an ‘internal 
squabble’. A Catholic civilian, Gerald Hasset, at 05:15 am appeared running from Springfield road 
bloodied from a fight and was heard saying that he was going to ‘fix the vigilantes’. At 06:05 am 
automatic fire was heard and three minutes later he staggered into the street with several shots 
to the chest. All those involved were identified as being Catholic.268 Such co-ethnic violence 
underlines the point that the primary actors of this conflict were not ethnic groups but rival 
organisations who claimed to act in the name of particular groups. Those who disputed such 
claims were often dealt with in a most violent manner.  
Following the IRA split, republican organisations engaged in a dual contest between themselves 
and the British state. Inter-organisational competition was distinct in that it concerned the 
control of streets and districts. The aim of this unordered game was to determine the behaviour 
of those living in geographically circumscribed areas. The specific geography of the split explains 
why republican outwards and inwards violence was to be mostly produced in Belfast. Of the 
twelve IRA units in Belfast only one remained loyal to the Goulding leadership. This was the 
Lowers Fall road unit under the command of McMillen and Sullivan, estimated to be seventy 
members strong. The Ballymurphy unit, to which Adams was a key member, took a neutral 
stance for three months before siding with the Provisionals. Whereas Andersonstown, Ardoyne, 
and New Lodge were from the start PIRA areas. The Markets, Short Strand, Twinbrook, and Turf 
Lodge were also republican zones of authority. It must be stressed that organisational control 
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was incomplete, each republican organisation would overtime establish companies in every 
Catholic area of Belfast, and the degrees of control would shift overtime.269 In stark contrast, in 
the early phase of the conflict, the OIRA retained near complete control of the Creggan and 
Bogside areas of Derry. Consequently, relations between the republican organisations there 
were never as competitive. For instance, in July 1970, the PIRA in Derry was said to be ‘Sean 
Keenan’s one man band’, with members at a mere 15-20.270 In rural areas, sides were often not 
taken, and if allegiance was given to one particular organisation it resulted from the provision 
of weapons.271 With decentralisation and fragmentation most acute in Belfast, it was there that 
the republican competition was most violent.  
IV 
The Adoption of Violence 
In November 1970, a British intelligence summary compared the situations in Belfast and Derry:  
‘On the IRA side, the current policy for the Londonderry/Donegal groups continues 
to be one of non-violence within the city. Again to use the parallel of events in 
Belfast, the alleged influx of IRA groups has considerably raised the level of 
violence, and we must continually guard and be alert against such a manoeuvre in 
Londonderry’.272 
A correlation was identified between fragmentation and the adoption of violence. Before 
delving into an analytical account of why outwards violence was adopted by the competing IRAs 
in Belfast, some scholarship must first be consulted. Recent contributions to the study of 
nationalist struggles have questioned the assumption that violence is a result of intractability. 
Lawrence, in a study of the Moroccan independence movement, has argued that violence was 
only adopted after a power struggle between nationalists was triggered. According to her, the 
specific trigger was leadership decapitation. The removal of powerful nationalist figures, the 
sultan and Istiqlal party leadership, in 1953, by the French, left the movement ‘comparable to a 
boat with neither helmsman nor rudder.’ A power vacuum was created, and multiple 
organisations sprung up to fill it. Despite sharing similar political objectives, they competed with 
one another using both outwards and inwards violence. In focusing on temporality, Lawrence 
crucially shows that contextual shifts alter the perceived necessity and appeal of certain 
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strategies.273 In a context of fragmentation, some organisations will adopt violence so as to 
extend their authoritative reach.  
A fundamental building block of authority is recognition, and violence provides a short-cut to 
achieving this. Bullets and bombs transmit political messages at a raised volume allowing them 
to be heard above a cacophony of spoken words. For marginal players, therefore, violence can 
often present a quick way to centrality. Politically relevant actors are a force to be reckoned in 
that they can dictate the nature and pace of events. This influence need not be positive, violence 
is often effective in ‘spoiling’ peaceful initiatives.274 Moreover, organisations employing peaceful 
strategies are faced with a dilemma of prospective marginality if a rival decides to adopt 
violence. In other words, once one organisation becomes violent, emulation is likely to follow. 
In sum, fragmentation, in producing an influx of organisations, changes the form of conflict and 
reshuffles the preferentiality of certain strategies.275 
Another point raised here is that political actors in war are engaged in multiple contests 
simultaneously. No longer should we view civil wars as simply two-sided affairs; they are instead 
an entanglement of secondary and primary conflict(s).276 Examining secondary conflicts is vital 
to understanding when and why violence is adopted. Turning back to the specific case of Irish 
republican inter-organisational competition, Philip Beresford has argued that the rival IRAs 
engaged in a ‘bitter competition to win the allegiance of the Catholic ghettoes in Belfast’, and 
that solely concentrating on the Provisionals, who were to later dominate republican 
proceedings, to the exclusion of the OIRA gives an ‘inaccurate picture’.277 Prince and Warner 
have developed this argument further by stating that the OIRA and PIRA were engaged in a ‘race 
for relevance’. The turn to violence, in their view, cannot be simply explained by an unalterable 
determination on the part of the PIRA to launch a military campaign.278 Violent strategies were 
being deployed for varied reasons and the OIRA, who favoured agitation first, were confronting 
the British Army violently by the summer of 1970 in an attempt to emulate the PIRA’s ‘defensive’ 
operations.  
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Building on this scholarly literature and using new archival evidence, this section argues that the 
so-called ‘defensive’ operations enacted by the rival IRAs, in 1970, were aimed at accelerating 
decentralisation and gaining organisational recognition. These ‘defensive’ operations did not 
comply with conventional military rationale. Such events, as O’Doherty has stated, were not ‘the 
pitting of one army against another for the sake of coercing an enemy with physical force… The 
gun battles were a type of propaganda theatre’.279 The victims of republican violence on such 
occasions may have been Protestants and British soldiers but the message was intended for the 
local Catholic populace. Before any guerrilla campaign could be properly launched a strategic 
base of support was required.  
In the course of 1970, the OIRA’s plans were to be rendered obsolete by an increasing number 
of violent confrontations in Belfast. As noted in the previous section, Sullivan was working to 
limit the occurrence of riotous and violent behaviour through a constructive relationship with 
the security forces. This was in line with the OIRA Army Council position. In early 1970, the British 
were informed, by a high-level source, that the Dublin-based OIRA leadership favoured a 
‘political approach’. They feared that a sectarian civil war of Catholic versus Protestant would be 
exploited by the British in the form of a federal solution for the whole of Ireland. For them, 
political success depended on the civil rights movement channelling the fight. This was 
reinforced at a meeting in Maghera, on 1 February, in which a strategy was devised to 
accomplish civil rights and proportional representation in Northern Ireland. One tactic discussed 
was the hosting of ceremonies where a covenant of civil rights could be signed en masse.280 An 
upsurge in violence, however, ruined these plans and forced the OIRA to take an increasingly 
militant stance.  
The increased number of disturbances in Belfast appear to have been provoked and amplified 
by PIRA members. This was part of the PIRA’s plan to assert itself as the most effective defence 
force and upstage its republican rivals. In March, Provisional auxiliaries circulated leaflets in 
Andersonstown addressed to residents; the message conveyed was an ominous one, ‘the danger 
to our community is far from ended… we find that our people in this area seem to ignore the 
signs of trouble… the volunteers of the Irish Republican Army are actively engaged in 
preparation for the defence of the area in the event of a possible attack upon it.’281 Provisionals 
were telling ‘their people’ that trouble was on the horizon and they were the force who would 
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defend them. At the end of March, two separate Easter parades to Milltown Cemetery were 
held demonstrating the strength of both factions in Belfast. The PIRA’s march was roughly three 
thousand strong while the Officials mustered over two thousand supporters.282 A contest for 
prominence was set to begin.  
Following the Easter commemorations, two days of rioting, spanning 1-2 April, occurred in 
Ballymurphy. The first day of rioting was triggered by Protestant families moving out of the area. 
At eight in the evening, crowds of both communities gathered, and a violent confrontation 
ensued. Sullivan and Devlin made their way to the scene in an attempt to calm the situation but 
ultimately failed. What happened the next day confirmed to British military observers that the 
‘trouble was not spontaneous.’ At three in the afternoon, seventy Catholic youths broke into the 
houses on Springfield road that had been evacuated by Protestant families. Shortly afterwards, 
women and children were moved into the premises prompting a response by the British Army 
to evict them. A local councillor, however, managed to persuade the occupants to return 
without incident to the Ballymurphy estate. This initiative bore the hallmarks of a pre-planned 
act of provocation, the speed with which women and children were moved in and their 
willingness to return without trouble indicated that some script was being followed.  
Having heard the news, a Protestant crowd assembled at nine that evening at the corner of 
Springfield Road/Springmartin Road followed by a similarly sized crowd of Catholics. 
Approaching midnight, after the Protestant crowd had mostly dissipated, violence was enacted 
by Catholic youths against the security forces. Some fifty petrol bombs were thrown, and the 
British responded by firing 2 CS grenades and 104 CS cartridges. Of those arrested several were 
identified as having IRA connections; ‘one man’, the son of an IRA member, was caught carrying 
an automatic .22 rifle and 53 rounds of ammunition. On 3 April, the Belfast Telegraph received 
an anonymous call from a man claiming to be an IRA member who said that they had been close 
to using guns. Further evidence suggested that the Provisionals had ‘in some ways organised’ 
the rioting. A series of meetings, attended by known IRA characters, had been held in the 
Ballymurphy area during the previous weekend to discuss ‘anti-establishment’ and ‘anti-
Protestant’ strategy.283 In republican terms, what is most striking about this episode is Sullivan’s 
attempted conciliatory approach in contrast to what appears to have been acts of provocation, 
in particular the occupation of the vacant houses. The events further polarised the two 
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communities and the PIRA’s organisational legitimacy as a necessary Catholic defence force was 
bolstered.  
With the Provisionals surging ahead and the situation inauspicious to reform, the Officials 
responded by adopting a more militant tone. On 5 April, a ‘Dungannon meeting of the Northern 
Command of the IRA’ issued a threat to British troops. It was initially assumed by the British that 
this emanated from the Provisionals. However, to their surprise they came to learn that this 
announcement in fact stemmed from an OIRA Army Council meeting held in Dublin. At that 
meeting, Costello had proposed a ‘Life for a Life’ policy which was seconded by McMillen and 
passed by a comfortable majority of three. In making it seem as if the decision had been reached 
in Dungannon, the OIRA leadership had hoped to counter-criticisms that all their policies were 
made in Dublin.284 In an interview on Ulster Television, an anonymous OIRA member stated on 
air that the Provisionals were ‘doing nothing about the present situation’ and suggested that ‘it 
may be 5 or 10 soldiers for every Irishman shot’.285 In announcing the potential use of violence, 
the Officials had been forced to partially jeopardise their planned campaign of political agitation.  
While the Officials were speaking of retaliation, the Provisionals were proactively ‘stirring up 
trouble’.286 A sequence of riots occurred in May that once again suggested Provisional 
provocation. On 9-10 May rioting in the New Lodge area replicated the Ballymurphy riots. After 
Protestant and Catholic crowds had confronted one another a ‘fight’ between Catholic youths 
and the British military took place. ‘Battles’ were waged along six different streets  with 159 CS 
cartridges being fired by the British and a multiplicity of missiles, including two petrol bombs, 
being hurled by the rioters. Another night of serious rioting followed on 17-18 May after three 
fires broke out simultaneously across the city. Crowds deliberately obstructed fire brigades from 
dealing with the blaze, and with troops consequently drawn into the Ardoyne and New Lodge 
areas, rioting unfolded with 20-30 petrol bombs being thrown.287 
These incidents revealed three observable patterns. The first relating to location; interface areas 
were identified as spots where Provisional provocation was most likely to occur and succeed. In 
making this assessment, the British correctly predicted that the Ardoyne and Ballymacarrett 
would be sites of future unrest. Spontaneous communal outpourings were not in evidence 
rather coordination and acts of provocation were required to mobilise people. ‘Republican 
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elements’ had prepared the ground before rioting in both cases and exploited the resulting 
polarisation.288 Ballymurphy, Ardoyne, and New Lodge were also importantly areas where the 
OIRA had little to no influence at that time. Secondly, acts of intimidation towards civilians was 
in evidence. For example, an anonymous call to Northern Ireland HQ, on 18 May, claimed that 
Catholic Ardoyne residents who had helped the troops during the night had been threatened, 
and others who preferred to stay neutral were told they would be shot, and their houses 
wrecked.289 When authoritative recognition was not given it was enforced through intimidation. 
Lastly, responsive public statements were repeatedly made by the OIRA as they lacked control 
over proceedings. On 18 May, a joint appeal for peace was made by the Belfast brigade of the 
OIRA and CCDC.290 Once again, violent confrontations were polarising groups and slowly 
rearranging organisational allegiances.  
In the summer of 1970, petrol bombs were superseded by bullets. So-called ‘defensive’ 
operations were mounted by both IRAs in a highly competitive fashion. Warner has done most 
to elucidate these events; he convincingly argues that the Falls Road Curfew was not a crucial 
turning point but a marked stage in the evolution of Catholic opinion.291 Organisational 
allegiances and feelings of ‘groupness’ were situational. In acknowledgement of this, republican 
organisations were adopting violence to transform the situation to their advantage. An IRA 
document, captured in early July, instructed its readers to be proactive, ‘Don’t wait on a 
revolutionary situation to arise- get up and out and create it… “Violence breeds violence”, 
“Reprisals invite counter-reprisals”’.292 Furthermore, a new piece of archival evidence has been 
unearthed which offers greater insight into the PIRA’s strategic thinking during that summer. As 
well as seeking to promote themselves above the OIRA they were also attempting to further 
accelerate decentralisation by prompting arms searches of loyalist premises in East Belfast. 
James Callaghan’s fear that ‘might both majority and minority communities turn on the British 
Army’ was the PIRA’s ideal situation.293 
With the marching season approaching, organisations made detailed plans of action. A report 
was received in early June stating that the OIRA were planning to use firearms at Cupar Street 
to halt an Orange Order march scheduled for 27 June.294 Rival plans were also said to have been 
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prepared by the Provisionals at meetings held around 13-14 June, and individual units briefed 
by 26 June.295 In advance of the highly anticipated events, a host of preparatory acts were 
utilised in order to heighten fears, these encompassed ‘malicious rumours’, ‘threatening letters’, 
and the placing of national flags in sensitive spots.296 
Acting on the intelligence received, the 27 June Orange march was re-routed so as to avoid 
Cupar street.297 This minor adjustment proved futile. At 14:54 pm a crowd of 600 formed at 
Cupar street and by 15:07 pm it was moving down the Kashmir onto the Springfield road so as 
to meet the march. At 15:18 pm a confrontation developed at the Mayo/Springfield junction. A 
rendition of ‘The Soldier’s Song’ was given by republicans and after one bottle was hurled at the 
parade, a stone throwing melee ensued. At 15:32 pm four rounds were fired from the republican 
crowd and two empty 9mm cases were later retrieved.298 This confrontation appears to have 
been an amended version of Sullivan’s original plan; plain clothed military personnel in the 
Catholic crowd heard one civilian say, ‘Don’t worry, the right boys are up front’.299  At the exact 
same time a coordinated republican onslaught of the New Barnsley RUC station was staged. This 
managed to draw off an Army patrol from the parade who en route to the police station were 
bombarded with stones.300 Within the space of six months, Sullivan’s approach had dramatically 
changed. In January he had been told by a British officer that a ‘return to normal is inevitable’ 
and that if he opposed this, he would lose support.301 Now in June, in fear of losing support to 
the Provisionals, the OIRA leader was actively planning violent engagements.  
The Officials may have fired the first shots that day, but these were to be muted by Provisional 
bullets. Typically, 27-28 June is remembered as the ‘defence’ of St Matthew’s Church in the Short 
Strand area of East Belfast. The Provisional Belfast brigade O/C, McKee, became a republican 
legend overnight, suffering serious wounds during a shootout in the churchyard.302 This PIRA 
operation was only possible, however, because British troops were distracted by violence in the 
Ardoyne area. Following the trouble on the Springfield road, opposing crowds had gathered at 
Hooker/Disraeli street. At 17:00 pm shots were fired from Hooker street and the first fatality 
was reported ten minutes later.303 Heavy fire then continued late into the evening. In 
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Ballymacarrett, East Belfast, trouble between rival crowds was likewise transformed into a gun 
battle when shots were fired in Seaforde street at 23:35 pm; with shooting continuing in the 
area until 05:30 am. Tied down elsewhere, the British military were not deployed into this area 
until 01:50 am. During the night, republicans discharged up to 1500 rounds. The victims of that 
day’s violence were mostly civilians: five Protestants and one Catholic were killed by gunfire, 
and a further fifty-eight civilians and three soldiers were injured.304 The Provisionals had flexed 
their muscles and in doing so ‘captured the headlines’.305 
A week later, on 3-4 July, the OIRA emulated the PIRA’s performance with a fiercely fought 
firefight with British troops. At about 18:00 pm, acting on a tip-off from a housewife, the Royal 
Scots Regiment and RUC carried out a successful arms search of 24 Balkan street, situated in the 
Lower Falls road area. A hostile crowd quickly developed, and the Army patrol was attacked with 
stones and bricks. A small PIRA company then escalated the situation by wounding five soldiers 
with two grenades. The resultant gun battle, however, was decided upon and carried out by 
OIRA members, who principally controlled the area.306 A demonstrative act of violence was 
required to forcefully transmit their commitment to the republican cause; no ‘saving grace’ was 
to aid the British this time. At 21:24 pm it was logged that the ‘IRA intend to fight an all-out 
battle tonight. Barricades were pre-fabricated.’ At 22:02 pm a curfew was implemented by the 
military for the Falls road area: people were instructed to stay indoors, or face arrest, and exits 
were wired off. Shooting exchanges between OIRA snipers and British troops went on into the 
night and early morning.307 During the gun battle, OIRA members were also frantically trying to 
salvage their ‘more attractive weapons’. Once the British managed to effectively cordon off the 
area, a largescale search was undertaken yielding 52 pistols, 35 rifles, 6 automatics, 14 shotguns, 
251 lbs of explosives, and 21,000 rounds of ammunition.308 The weapons haul was a significant 
one, but the traumatic experience endured by the residents felt like, and was easily portrayed 
as, an invasion by a foreign occupying force.  
The Provisionals immediately tried to redefine this event to the exclusion of the OIRA. On 5 July, 
with the curfew practically ended, a women’s march was instigated by Provisional Sinn Fein. 
Early that morning, notices were put through letterboxes about a procession from Casement 
Park to the Lower Falls ‘in an effort to break the present curfew’. Great emphasis was placed 
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upon gender; only women and children could attend, each carrying a ‘loaf or a bottle of milk’.309 
This march allowed the Provisional’s to address both of their principal competitors: according to 
them, the British Army had ‘raped’ the Falls road area and women consequently came to rescue 
it.310 Note here how the cultural mould of patriarchal militarism was used to discredit the OIRA. 
Men were traditionally depicted as saving women. In this case, however, the women’s march 
was deliberately constructed to invert this equation.  
The decision to implement the curfew had also been influenced by unionist politicians applying 
pressure in the intervening week. Following the widespread incidents of violence on 27-28 June, 
doubts had been raised about the military’s ability to keep order, and demands were made for 
a re-arming of the RUC and a revival of the USC.311 In the aftermath of the curfew, relations 
between the military and Protestants markedly improved, it was noted that ‘troops were more 
readily accepted in extreme Protestant areas’.312 Political actors on the ground understood that 
organisational support was never fixed. Efforts were thus made by the PIRA to undermine the 
British Army’s newfound authority in Protestant areas. Sometime in late July, an important 
meeting between Lieutenant Colonel A.D.Myrtle of the King’s Own Scottish Borderers and 
nationalist politician Gerry Fitt took place. Fitt informed Myrtle that as he was about to get into 
a car, in the area of the Newsletter, he was approached by a man and handed an envelope on 
which was written: 
‘K.Tombs(?) and Cyril Johnstone(?) next door. That is where they’ve got their stuff- 
we can’t get it, it’s up to you to get it.’313  
Fitt suspected that the man who passed him the envelope was a Provisional. In light of this, 
British military personnel made a number of observations. The named persons were identified 
as suspected Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) members, and Johnstone was located as living at 1 
Woodstock Road, East Belfast. It was assumed that the weapons were either stored there or 
next door. With this in mind, they concluded that the republicans had used Fitt as a means of 
passing information onto them in the hope that the Army would search these premises. Fitt was 
chosen in this incidence for two deducible reasons: firstly, he was frequently in contact with the 
Army; and, secondly, it placed greater pressure on the British to act. As they themselves noted, 
‘it is important that we act on this if… there is an incident concerning Tombs(?) and Jonhstone(?) 
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there could be nasty repercussions for the Army, particularly from Fitt’. In concluding that some 
positive action needed to be taken, they planned to inform Special Branch and have 45 
Commando watch the premises.314 
Two other pieces of evidence may be connected to this. The Provisionals, at this time, declared 
publicly that if Protestants were attacked, they would offer assistance.315 In trying to provoke 
arms searches into East Belfast, the Falls Road Curfew will have been fresh in their mind. 
Moreover, on 28 July, an incidence of ‘IRA factional fusion’ was recorded: a military patrol 
witnessed McMillen pick up, in his Volkswagen car, a badly limping McKee.316 What was 
discussed between them is unknown. However, the timings suggest that the above strategy may 
have been ventilated; an attempt to turn Protestants against the British Army was in line with 
the OIRA’s strategic approach. In this game of politics, the teams were constantly in flux; 
enemies one day could be allies the next.317 To complicate matters further, hostile actors were 
using each other as tools to engineer certain ends. If we combine this evidence, it amounts to 
an attempt to accelerate decentralisation. An intelligence summary in October stressed that a 
rise in organisations made the ‘imposition of central discipline difficult’.318 This is exactly what 
the PIRA were aiming for. Loyalist paramilitaries hostile to central control would further 
destabilise Belfast, and any opportunity to extend their own authority into previously 
unsupportive areas would have been a bonus. This stratagem ultimately failed but its excavation 
is important for it demonstrates the political nature of the conflict. Confrontations originally 
interpreted as spontaneous incidents of communal outrage were in fact the result of planned 
acts of provocation designed by political actors to mobilise people.  
During the remaining months of 1970, the Army managed to regain some support in Catholic 
areas. Aid provided by British soldiers during flooding in North Belfast, on 16 August, improved 
relations there.319 Later that month, residents in the Ardoyne welcomed moves by the military 
to remove some barriers and cut doors in others.320 Even in late September, the New Lodge area 
was noted as being ‘extremely quiet and well behaved’. A ‘marked change of attitude’ was 
evident across Catholic areas, with residents being ‘extremely friendly with the security 
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forces’.321 What emerges from the intelligence material is oscillating levels of organisational 
support, no linear pathway or critical moment is viewable.  
This situation was to be reversed in early 1971. Following house searches in the Clonard area, 
the PIRA murdered the first British soldier, Gunner Robert Curtis, on 6 February 1971. Journalist 
Dominick J. Coyle, in an article entitled ‘Enemy in Ulster’, perceptively wrote that ‘Their sniper 
bullets are indeed aimed at ordinary British soldiers, but the message is intended for the IRA 
regulars…’.322 In other words, victims were selected with other targets in mind. Deciphering the 
‘intended targets’ of violent acts is far from straightforward, one bullet can target many.  
V 
Raising the Volume 
On 14 May 1972, an article in Republican News, entitled ‘How the War is Being Won’, asserted 
that it had taken ‘the roar of the bomb and gun to make them listen.’323 This desire to be heard 
was the driving force behind increasing levels of republican violence in 1971-2. In order to 
provide an insight into this escalation, a short case study, spanning 15-21 April 1972, will be 
detailed here. This single week was one of the most violent periods of the whole thirty-year 
conflict and, in republican terms, was an anomaly in that OIRA violence eclipsed the PIRA’s 
activities. The PIRA’s response to these developments reveals the extent to which the secondary 
and primary conflicts were entangled. With the Officials surging ahead of them, they tried to 
stage a sensational bomb attack that, had it succeeded, would have literally shook Northern 
Ireland. In essence, violence was amplified by republican organisations so as to drown out rival 
political acts. 
In a high-level meeting, on 21 April, GOC Harry Tuzo stated that activity ‘had been more intense 
than in any single period since internment’. In validating this point, he said ‘there were up to 20 
shootings in a 24-hour period in Belfast, largely round the Divis Flats.’324 In fact, the level of 
violence was so high the British were having difficulty keeping track. Another summary 
suggested that over a three-day period ‘approximately 140 shooting incidents’ had occurred.325 
The spatial distribution of this violence, however, meant they were certain about one thing: it 
was the OIRA producing it. British personnel measured the changing levels of republican control 
across the city and could confidently state, at that time, the ‘Divis Flats are an Official 
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Stronghold’.326 Two explanations for this OIRA violence were given: firstly, leading OIRA member 
Joe McCann had been shot dead on 15 April by British forces; and, secondly, it was asserted that 
‘the Officials did not want to lose out to the Provisionals’, violence allowed them to ‘prove their 
ability to control events’.327 In weighing up the two reasons, British observers placed greater 
emphasis on the second; Tuzo felt that ‘they used the shooting of McCann as an excuse’.328 In 
support of this view, they had received intelligence reports in the preceding weeks that indicated 
both IRAs were about to launch a major offensive. Discounting the influence of McCann’s death 
maybe a mistake here, in personal terms he was liked by many and in organisational terms, 
leaders often become symbolic markers of organisational strength. In reaction to high profile 
losses, organisations often seek to reassert themselves; the Officials, in this case, chose to do 
this through violence. A competitive logic was also at play, they could not afford to appear weak 
in comparison to the PIRA and violence offered them an opportunity to regain primacy.  
In fact, the Provisionals were recorded as having tried ‘to cash in on McCann’s death’. Barricades, 
mostly constructed from hi-jacked vehicles, were raised in the Falls, Ballymurphy, Turf Lodge, 
and Andersonstown districts, with the aim of establishing ‘No Go’ areas. A cautious security 
force approach, however, limited the trouble to Divis Flats. In a lengthy gun battle, one soldier 
was killed, and five others wounded. Moving westwards to Derry, the OIRA killed two soldiers in 
what they called ‘revenge operations’. These shooting incidents, according to British records, 
had not been ‘the most significant event of the week’. Elsewhere in Derry, the PIRA had planted 
a 450 lb bomb in Essex factory situated beside the Blighs Lane Army post. Their aim in planting 
this bomb was to strike a sensational blow against the security forces. The Ammunition Technical 
Staff spent seven hours dismantling the device and estimated that, had it exploded, it would 
have severely damaged all houses within one hundred yards and shattered every window in 
Derry. The sheer size of this bomb indicates that the Provisionals were concerned with the 
OIRA’s newly gained prominence. In their eagerness to outbid their rivals, the British felt that 
the PIRA had ‘not considered the effects of the explosion’.329 Violence was deliberately tuned to 
achieve maximum impact. The tendency in this highly competitive environment was to raise the 
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volume, but, as Bloody Friday would later show, the potential consequences of such spectacular 
acts were not always given careful thought.330 
VI 
Message in a Bullet 
At 22:36 pm, on 24 April 1967, the RUC received a 999 call from John Francis Hendron, a 
republican by politics and electrician by trade. Hendron detailed how he had been shot in the 
neck by one of four men who had accosted him at the junction of Abercorn Street North, Sorella 
Street, and Dunville Street, Belfast. Although Hendron failed to identify his assailants, the RUC 
deduced that the attack was carried out by the IRA who were ‘concerned about the activities of 
Hendron’s splinter group’. Notably, Hendron had already received threats and warnings.331 
Unable to limit Hendron’s activities with spoken and written words, the IRA had sent him a 
message in the form of a bullet. The act was intended as a most intrusive one, trauma alters the 
perceived value of certain actions, and Hendron would be consequently forced to think twice 
before contesting the IRA’s authority again.332 Other means of coercion, such as imprisonment, 
were unavailable to the IRA, and so violence was adopted.  
Internal republican violence was, of course, never absent. Localised splinter groups had been in 
action during the 1960s.333 After the 1969 split, however, a dramatic increase in incidents of 
inwards violence is visible.334 The intricate detail necessary to provide a thorough chronological 
account of inwards violence is currently impossible due to the unavailability of key archival 
documents. The purpose of this final section, therefore, is to lay the groundwork for future oral 
and archival research. I do this by highlighting several patterns identifiable in the patches of 
evidence available.  
Fundamentally, inter-organisational competition was a distinct form of conflict in which violent 
methods were adopted so as to limit the activities of organisational rivals and to control local 
areas. This violence can itself be unpacked: intrusive, disabling, and extractive violence, such as 
pistol-whippings, punishment shootings, beatings, kidnappings, and torture, was predominantly 
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used. Republicans often avoided lethal violence as they were conscious of keeping the local 
populace onside.335 Sociologist Frank Bourton, who undertook fieldwork in Belfast, in 1972-3, 
found that Provisionals took care not to overstep the mark: ‘If the movement persistently 
violated community norms, doors would stop opening, billets would be harder to get, informing 
would rise and their isolation would increase.’336 Moreover, high levels of intelligence allowed 
for finely tuned operations. British military observers noted that the victims of internal 
republican violence were well-targeted, that conscious efforts to enforce a shoot-to-wound 
policy were made, and even assumed that one fatality resulted from a ‘panicky gunman’.337  
Understanding the spatial distribution and temporal variation of this violence presents the 
researcher with a most challenging task. A pattern is, however, observable in the available 
material: moments of contestation and shifts in spatial control appear to have triggered at least 
some of the violence. Endogeneity is stressed here as opposed to some exogenous ‘hangover’ 
from the split.338 Still further, British Army personnel were keenly aware that the success of their 
operations had a major impact on the degrees of republican control. This led them to predict 
with some confidence, the occurrence, location, and intensity of such rivalry. Other non-violent 
strategies included cross-organisational alliances, front organisations, and the provision of 
services. 
In this irregular civil war, spatial control mattered greatly. In a 1973 British military paper, an in-
depth analysis of popular collaboration was given. It stated that no matter how ‘hard’ an area 
maybe it is intimidation that ensures the IRA’s safety: ‘A little intimidation goes a long way. One 
tarring, or one assassination is enough…’. Collaboration was understood to be a continuum 
stretching from open opposition to open support. A common consequence of intimidation was 
no information being given to the security forces and passive support for the IRA. ‘Passive 
support’ consisted of the following: ‘if the IRA want to use someone’s house they can’. A few, 
however, engaged in ‘active support’, comprising participation in local riots and auxiliary 
tasks.339 Spatial control, therefore, mattered greatly to the revolutionary forces for it allowed 
them to act behind a ‘veil of secrecy’.340 Equally as important was the influence local control had 
on political allegiances. Speaking of Father D. Wilson of Ballymurphy, who was suspected of 
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involvement with the PIRA, a British Lieutenant Colonel stated that he ‘could not avoid being 
associated with them because they live all around him.’341 This epitomises the difficulty facing 
the incumbents; all security force operations depended on ‘good’ intelligence, and this 
information was mostly held by civilians who were within the authoritative remit of republican 
organisations.342 In acknowledging this, the ‘principal aim’ of British military policy was to 
separate the Catholic community from the IRA.343  
However, collaboration was complicated by the presence of competitors. It was mentioned in 
the above paper that ‘Officials often act as a counter force to Provo intimidation- people are 
prepared to stand up to the Provos with the Officials backing.’344 Local control was, therefore, 
contested between rival republicans. In a 1974 interview, Goulding captured the essence of this 
inter-organisational competition. He asserted that the Provisionals had previously enjoyed 
predominant control within Belfast, citing the Ardoyne, Clonard, and Ballymurphy areas as 
having been PIRA strongholds, leaving the OIRA isolated to the Lower Falls. By 1974, he claimed 
a reversal had taken place, ‘we have the best control of people in those areas (now)’ and, in the 
Falls, ‘I suppose 70% of the people support us’.345 This was a heavily skewed reading of territorial 
fortunes, but the topic of discussion is what matters here. Republicans were measuring the 
degrees of control and seeking to change or maintain those percentages.346 In this case, Goulding 
massaged the score line to make it seem as if his side were winning in order to help bring about 
authoritative displacement. Trumpeting victories, covering up defeats, and seeming to be 
winning influenced levels of support. The best-known example is the PIRA’s declaration of 1972 
as the ‘Year of Victory’. This is often read as a sign of conviction, but while this may be partly the 
case, the accompanying article reveals the underlying strategic intent, as it stressed ‘The time 
for sitting on the fence is past’.347 
How control was measured by adversaries and the civilian population is a topic that needs closer 
attention. Adversaries appear to have measured operational capacity using the following 
measurements: the number, and operational ability, of volunteers; the quantity and quality of 
weapons; and financial resources.348 In terms of civilian receptivity, the number of safe houses, 
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arms dumps, and the magnitude of rioting, along with security force success rates, appear to 
have been used as markers.349 From a civilian standpoint, propaganda, paramilitary patrols, and 
gossip must have been used as indicators. Knowing who was winning overall, and locally, helped 
civilians calculate the value of collaborating with certain actors or remaining neutral.350  
Dominance of one republican faction, in a certain area, led to side changing. For example, in July 
1972, in the New Lodge area of North Belfast, it was recorded that previously known OIRA 
members had ‘converted’ to the PIRA, substantiating the claim that the ‘Officials had virtually 
no hold in North Belfast any more’.351 By November, the pendulum had swung back in favour of 
the OIRA. In an intelligence summary, it was stated that the Officials in New Lodge, ‘are in a 
much stronger position than the Provisionals in both manpower and weapons.’352 Territorial 
fortunes fluctuated and with them so did allegiances. In sum, the aim of the inter-organisational 
game was to acquire spatial control. The victors, temporarily at least, secured organisational 
sustenance and social power.  
In this form of conflict, violence was frequently used as a means of authoritative extension and 
retention. This was paradoxical to institutional competition where peaceful strategies were 
mostly chosen. Ó Brádaigh had, apparently, raised questions to the Marxist republicans about 
what would happen following a split: 
‘How are you going to cope with us? There’d never come an answer. And I know 
well what you’d do to us- put us against the bloody wall and behind barbed wire 
and six feet under… of course they were too smart to say that but this is the logical 
outcome of the whole damn thing.’353 
The key words here are ‘cope’, ‘smart’, and ‘logical’. Organisational rivals did not recognise each 
other’s authority willingly. Violence was therefore used to coerce, disempower, and, on 
occasion, eliminate rivals who were hard to ‘cope’ with. The logic here was authoritative 
extension; violence allowed republicans to better control events. In terms of being smart, Ó 
Brádaigh may have outsmarted himself here, as the post-hoc justifications given by republicans 
persistently emphasised criminality and betrayal. Opponents were discredited as ‘informers’, 
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them that ‘the IRA can no longer win’. TNA, CJ 4/3463, The Undermining of the IRA’s will to Fight, 31 
January 1975. Also see Kalyvas, Logic of Violence, 12; English, Does Terrorism Work?, 140.  
351 TNA, WO 305/4742/2, 39 Brigade INTSUM, 20 July 1970. Another example found in TNA, WO 
305/4212, 3 Brigade INTSUM, 17 April 1973.  
352 TNA, WO 305/4746/1, 39 Brigade INTSUM, 22 November 1972.  
353 White, Out of the Ashes, 70.  
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‘renegade Irishman’, and social menaces.354 This, however, appears to have been interpretative 
coding. IRA members were instructed to carry out operations with justifications in mind. A 
captured IRA document stated that ‘when you have decided an operation has to be carried out 
the action must be justified.’355 Operations were deliberately enacted at certain times and styled 
in certain ways to enhance the creditability of their justifications. 
Not all violence was instrumental. In a context of decentralisation, violence could be privatized. 
For example, on 2 June 1976, RUC Constable Ronald McAdam was murdered outside the Royal 
Victoria Hospital by an OIRA member. The motive for the murder was recorded as follows: ‘he 
had a personal grudge against the detective.’356 What first appears to be a killing arising from 
the master cleavage, was, supposedly, the result of a ‘personal grudge’. Crucially, personal, 
secondary, and primary conflicts overlapped to create a war that resembled an entangled ball 
of wool.357 
Returning to internal republican violence, acts of territorial contestation were a notable trigger. 
In each area, organisational authority was contested through the distribution of propaganda and 
the mounting of operations against the security forces. Brendan Hughes, a former member of 
the PIRA’s D Company situated in the Falls road area, recalled that attempts to sell the PIRA’s 
Belfast paper, Republican News, during 1970-1, was suppressed by the OIRA: ‘we were 
constantly put against the wall, the papers taken off us and burned.’358 Propaganda was used to 
increase the profile of an organisation, making recruitment and support more likely. The 
predominant faction, in this case the OIRA, were clearly conscious of this, and sought to quell 
the prospect of a disadvantageous shift in control.  
In spatial terms, inwards violence was mostly produced in areas where there was a discrepancy 
in control, and the area-specific republican power balance determined the direction of this 
violence. In most cases, the predominant faction targeted the weaker party.359 For instance, on 
18 December 1970, eight OIRA members were detained overnight in a hall, in the Ardoyne area, 
by armed PIRA members, who used this act of disempowerment to reinforce their warning to 
the kidnapped persons that they would be shot if they operated in the area.360 Furthermore, in 
 
354 An Phoblacht, June 1970; Republican News July 1971; Republican News, 1 November 1975.  
355 TNA, WO 305/3783, HQ Northern Ireland INTSUM, 9 July 1970.  
356 TNA, DEFE 24/1226, Notes of a Meeting on Northern Ireland, 17 June 1976.  
357 Comparative examples in Swedenburg, Memoirs of Revolt, 139-170. 
358 Moloney, Voices from the Grave, 61.  
359 An intelligence report commented that competition only occurred ‘where the Officials are strong 
enough to do something about it.’ TNA, WO 305/4742/2, 39 Brigade INTSUM, 27 July 1972.  
360 TNA, WO 305/3783, HQ Northern Ireland INTUSM, 31 December 1970.  
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March 1971, violent clashes between republicans occurred after the OIRA carried out operations 
against the British Army in Ballymurphy. This prompted the PIRA to use counteractive violence, 
in the form of a pistol-whipping, that in turn led to violent reprisals elsewhere.361 These 
examples demonstrate that republican organisations were prepared to use violence against one 
another as a means of ensuring spatial control.362 Counteractive violence, however, often 
triggered a vicious cycle of revenge. This only ceased when, out of strategic necessity, truces 
were established.363  
Primary initiatives impacted upon the secondary contests at play. Security force activity, such as 
arrest operations, shootings, weapons finds, and detainee releases, could create, and fill, 
authoritative voids.364 In late 1972, a most telling intelligence assessment was given:  
‘Security force success against the Provisionals in the (Lower Falls) area has created 
a vacuum and the people at present are undecided as to their actions and who to 
support.’365 
Powers of release, as well as imprisonment, influenced the degrees of control. It was noted on 
one occasion that the OIRA had regained control of an area ‘probably as a result of the large 
number of recently released Officials’.366  
Shifts in control, caused by security force successes, sometimes triggered internal republican 
violence. A two-month sequence of intelligence summaries, produced by the 24th Infantry 
Brigade, regarding the Markets and Short Strand area during August-September 1972, shows 
how increasing rates of attrition against the PIRA played to the OIRA’s advantage. The remaining 
Provisionals, having lost considerable local support, threatened the Officials. In early September, 
Provisionals, Gerard McCrory, James Gibney and Cormack McArt, ‘arrested’ two OIRA members, 
blamed them for recent arrests, and warned that if anymore Provisionals were picked up 
Officials would be shot in ‘retaliation’. The OIRA C Company Adjutant, Thomas Conlon, in 
response had four Provisionals kidnapped. A week or so later, on 18 September, a punch-up in 
 
361 Hanley and Millar, Lost Revolution, 162-3.  
362 Control was maximised by driving out families known to support competitors. TNA, WO 305/3783, 
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the Markets between rival members was recorded.367 In short, as levels of control changed 
overtime, violence was used to reverse or cement territorial fortunes.368 
Inwards republican violence could, and had to, be restrained due to intimacy. A republican 
intelligence document, captured as part of an OIRA arms dump, best evinces the multiple 
contests that were simultaneously at play. One piece of paper bore information regarding 
possible UVF members, two registration numbers of vehicles alleged to belong to the ‘Branch’, 
and the following reference to PIRA movements: ‘Provies in Ardoyne moved gear to Rathcoole 
in light blue Zephyr…’.369 The key to operational success was intelligence. With this in mind, 
republican organisations were having to collect information on a multiplicity of enemies. The 
quality of intelligence regarding each organisation varied considerably. In terms of republican 
competitors, the level of information was high-grade. A volunteer of the PIRA’s B Company third 
battalion, whose operational remit was East Belfast, under questioning, gave security force 
personnel a detailed insight into the hierarchies of both IRAs, detailing names and rank.370 This 
intimate knowledge allowed republicans to be highly selective and use violent methods that 
were non-lethal.371 
Non-violent strategies were also employed. In August 1970, a meeting was held in Dublin 
between leading members of the OIRA and Catholic priests who were intent on revolutionising 
their Church. The purpose of the meeting was ‘to form an alliance for mutual support’. In the 
end, a trade-off was agreed to: the socialist-inclined priests would be helped in their institutional 
endeavour and be allowed to ‘takeover’ the CDCs; if a Bishop attempted to discipline the priests, 
the OIRA would pressurise the bishop to rescind; in return, the priests would speak on platforms 
about socio-economic issues and counter claims that the OIRA were ‘communist controlled’.372 
In sum, a cross-organisational alliance had been formed, with the Marxist republicans hoping to 
utilise the soft power of the Catholic Church in their primary and secondary endeavours. 
Similarly, the OIRA also used front organisations in Belfast as a covert means of weakening the 
PIRA’s strategic base. A branch of the Catholic Ex-Serviceman’s Association (CESA) in 
Ballymurphy was understood by British intelligence, in October 1971, to have come under the 
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sway of the Officials who were attempting to use the organisation as means of undermining the 
Provisionals.373 Front organisations offered the Officials a chance to make a fresh appeal to the 
local people.  
More promising and noteworthy, according to the British, were OIRA attempts to offer services 
to the local people. In July 1972, the OIRA O/C of C Company first battalion, upon release from 
prison, opened a shop, and signs in its window read, ‘Support your Official Republican 
Movement and the People’s Co-op’.374 A week later, it was recorded that the OIRA had opened 
another shop, this time a cut-price butchers in the Falls area. This effort to improve local facilities 
and win support by peaceful means was highlighted as an ‘interesting’ development.375 As well 
as opening shops they were protecting them, on 16 November, Provisionals planted a bomb in 
Magills shop on the Monagh road, in the New Lodge area, after it had been warned not to serve 
soldiers. Officials having heard of the incident arrived on the scene, dragged the bomb of out 
the shop, and called the security forces. In the end, the bomb was found to be a dummy, but 
the Officials, in risking their lives, had powerfully made their point that ‘shops were for the good 
of the people’ and they would not allow the ‘few amenities that they have in the area to be 
destroyed.’376 This raises an important point; the means of authoritative extension could be 
‘soft’ and/or ‘hard’. In trying to stimulate the local economy by opening and protecting shops, 
the OIRA were attempting a small-scale project likened to Keynesian economics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
373 TNA, WO 305/4599/3, 39 Brigade INTSUM, 28 October 1971.  
374 TNA, WO 305/4742/2. 39 Brigade INTSUM, 5 July 1972.  
375 TNA, WO 305/4742/2, 39 Brigade INTSUM, 12 July 1972.  
376 TNA, WO 305/4746/1, 39 Brigade INTSUM, 22 November 1972.  
 73 
 
Conclusion 
‘A Tangled Skein’ 
In September 1972, a Derry businessman approached two British contacts and asked them to 
convey a message to MI6 officer Frank Steele. The message stemmed from the PIRA leader, Ó 
Brádaigh, and comprised two interlinked points. Point one confirmed that, despite maintaining 
a veil of unity, there was ‘in fact a serious split in the IRA between militants led by MacStíofáin… 
and the “politicals” led by O’Connell and himself who wanted to end violence.’ Point two, asked 
for help: ‘He (Ó Brádaigh) wanted this message to be passed secretly to HMG in the hope that 
HMG could… strengthen the position of the ‘political’ faction sufficiently to enable them to beat 
MacStíofáin’.377  
Former teammates, MacStíofáin and Ó Brádaigh, had become competitors. Ó Brádaigh, who 
favoured a move away from the war path, was seeking external help from the British 
government. Another point of intersection between the primary and secondary conflicts had 
developed.  
In highlighting this final point, I want to conclude by emphasising that the Troubles was an 
entanglement of conflicts. Typically, two parallel narratives of the Troubles are given, one ‘anti-
republican’ and one ‘anti-British’.378 The primary evidence, however, presents a complicated 
history of not one conflict but many, and these conflicts overlapped in complex ways resembling 
an entangled ball of wool. Merlyn Rees conceptualised the situation in Northern Ireland in these 
very terms: ‘These problems are a tangled skein; I want to make a start on unravelling them.’379 
Keeping this analogy in mind, a critical eye can be applied to the historical endeavour. The 
historian uses remnants of the past, found in the present, to construct a history using a number 
of methodological tools. The historical process is, therefore, an intellectual one in that it seeks 
to create an abstract product, a history. Many historians often portray themselves as ‘lie 
detectors’ or ‘regulators’.380 As a result of this, the historical task is often viewed as a negative 
one. While I wholly agree that histories should not be easily utilised, they should, however, 
encourage engagement. For instance, this dissertation has begun to construct an entangled ball 
of wool comprised of overlapping lines of competition. Crucially, a ‘tangled skein’ is of no 
immediate use; it requires critical engagement, in the form of disentanglement, before any 
 
377 TNA, FCO 87/4, NIO London Telegram No.32 
378 Ian McBride, ‘Dealing with the Past: Historians and the Northern Ireland Conflict’ (Unpublished 
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garment can be woven. As English has emphasised, the historian has no power over how their 
history will be received, the aim of history is to simply induce critical and reflective 
engagement.381  
In viewing the Troubles as a ‘tangled skein’, new questions and insights into the dynamics of civil 
wars and the politics of Northern Ireland are possible. For example, future research regarding 
centralisation within and between organisations could be conducted. McBride has already noted 
how in the 1980s republicans were actively engaging with state institutions, not only electorally, 
but in competition for regeneration projects. By the 1990s, the peace-and-reconciliation 
industry had become the largest employer in the region, funded from London, Dublin, and 
Brussels. Republican economic life had, thus, become dominated by state interventions.382 
Perhaps then instead of thinking of ‘democracy’ or consociationalism as the perquisite to peace 
in Northern Ireland we should be researching authoritative incorporation. For the conflicts in 
Northern Ireland have not ended, they have merely been institutionalised. As this dissertation 
has argued, political players choose their strategies in a most situational manner. Institutional 
competition offers political players an array of peaceful strategies, whereas inter-organisational 
competition is a qualitatively different playing field in which violence is more readily adopted. 
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